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NOTES
THE LAMB DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS*
IN THE fervoi of argument before a trial judge, it is not unusual for an
attorney to lapse into hasty, ill-conceived phrases.1 Particularly when the
issue involves fundamental social problems, the formal and dignified atmos-
phere of the courtroom is apt to lose much of its restraining influence- A
pending disbarment proceeding against a CIO attorney for his courtroom
conduct has focused the attention of bar and public on how vehemently a
lawyer may press his convictions without being guilty of an unpardonable
violation of his duties as an officer of the court 3
The charges against the attorney are intelligible only in-the light of the
situation which formed the background for the alleged improprieties. After
having obtained individual contracts of employment from many of its workers,'
the Williams Manufacturing Company of Ohio brought suit in a state court
to enjoin a local union from picketing the factory on the ground that it would
interfere with the performance of these contracts." At the preliminary hear-
ing, the attorney for the union, Edward Lamb,0 argued for a denial of the
petition for a temporary restraining order because the company was guilty
of unfair labor practices under the Wagner Act, and therefore did not come
into court with clean hands.7 He also contended that the contracts were void
*In the Matter of Charges against Edward Lamb, Court of Common Pleas, Scioto
County, Ohio, No. 29986.
1. Courts have taken into account this propensity in cases involving counsel's
conduct in the trial court Curran v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 258, 236 Pac. 975
(1925) (contempt) ; People v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 115, 285 Pac. 753 (1930) (disbarment).
2. The same is true, of course, under the less formalized procedure of administrative
bodies performing functions similar to those of courts. See, e.g., the angry outburst of
Mr. Columbo, attorney for the Ford Company, in hearing before trial examiner of NLRB:
" . . . I'm treated like a horse-thief here instead of an officer of a court of justice."
N. Y. Times, July 28, 1937, p. 6, col. 1.
3. In the Matter of Charges against Edward Lamb, Court of Common Pleas,
Scioto County, Ohio, No. 29986. See N. Y. Times, April 11, 1938, p. 1, col 3.
4. The contracts provided that the employee agreed to work for the company
for six months; the company promised to hire him at the same basic rate as was then
being paid. Either party could terminate the contract on fifteen days notice. The com-
pany had the power to dismiss the employee if an insufficiency or stoppage of vork
required it. Record, Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Workers of America, Local 119,
p. 22 (Hereinafter referred to as Record, Williams case).
5. Some of the employees were also joined as plaintiffs.
6. Mr. Lamb is Executive Vice-President of the National Lawyers Guild and
Regional Counsel for the CIO. A committee consisting of Solicitor-General Robert H.
Jackson, Assistant Attorney-Generaf Thurman IV. Arnold, Commissioner Jerome Frank:
of the SEC, and numerous other practicing attorneys, judges and professors have sup-
ported the Guild in defending him. N. Y. Times, April 11, 1938, p. 1, col 3.
7. Testimony was proffered to the effect that the company had discharged men
for union activities, had refused to bargain collectively, and had broken an agreement,
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because secured by coercion and for the unconscionable purpose of strike-
breaking;8 that the picketing did not constitute an interference with per-
formance of the contracts ;9 and that the right to strike was of necessity a
pertinent, if not decisive, factor in the case.' 0 The presiding judge refused
to consider either the merits of the case or the strike issue," and ruled that
the scope of the hearing would be confined to determining whether the con-
tracts existed, whether they were legal,' 2 and whether the defendant union
threatened interference with their performance.' 3 After a hearing on this
basis, the judge granted the temporary restraining order. 14 Later the judge
appointed a committee of three members of the Ohio bar to investigate
Lamb's conduct during the hearing. 1 The committee recommended that Lamb
be disbarred for "unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude."'1
In view of the novelty of the charges, the committee's complaint merits
detailed examination. The first of four specifications charges Lamb with un-
professional conduct because he knew that his statements during the trial
would bring the court into disrepute by causing spectators to believe that it
was unfair, partial and unjust. Excerpts from the trial record are quoted to
substantiate this charge. In addition to scattered angry outbursts and ill-
phrased incidental remarks, particular emphasis is placed upon Lamb's state-
ments concerning the plaintiff's attempted use of the court as a strike-breaking
agency ;17 his vigorous assertion of the union's right to employ the defense
made with a Regional Director of the NLRB, to rehire certain employees with back
pay. Record, Williams case, pp. 10, 84, 113, 119-121, 173, 176, 182, 185.
8. The proffered evidence indicated that the employees were threatened with dis-
missal unless they signed the contracts. Record, Williams case, pp. 2, 7, 56, 161, 175.
9. Record, Williams case, pp. 103, 104.
10. Record, Williams case, pp. 2, 4, 7.
11. The court stated that a second hearing would be had on the merits. Record,
Williams case, pp. 15, 24, 107, 120.
12. The contracts followed the pattern of similar employment contracts previously
upheld by an Ohio court. Hamilton Tailoring Company v. Cincinnati Joint Board,
132 Ohio St. 259, 7 N. E. (2d) 1 (1937), dismissing on procedural grounds an unreported
decision of the Court of Appeals, rev'g 4 Ohio 0. 295 (C. P. 1935).
13. The strike had evidently been peaceably conducted, marked only by scattered
incidents of name calling, hair pulling, and threatening words and actions, for which
the strikers appeared only partly responsible. Record, Williams case, pp. 48, 51, 52,
58-61, 63-65, 70, 75, 76, 89, 90, 97, 98, 125.
14. The defendants were restrained "from making statements, either verbally or
through signs or placards, calculated to induce the plaintiff employees to break their
employment contract . . . or preventing the plaintiff company from carrying out its
part of the contract by furnishing employees with employment . . . " (1938) 6 I. J. A.
BULL 105 (criticizing sweeping terms of injunction).
15. N. Y. Times, April 11, 1938, p. 1, col. 3. See (1937) 6 I. J. A. BuLL. 43.
16. In the Matter of Charges against Edward Lamb, Court of Common Pleas, Seloto
County, No. 29986. OHio.GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 1707.
17. By Mr. Lamb: "If they can get the Court to act as their strike-breaking
agency, Mr. Williams will be able to say, 'See what we did. We can't get the judge
of our Court, but we can get another foreign judge to come in and break the strike
for us.'". Record, Williams case, p. 28. The presiding judge was from another county
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of the "filthy, dirty hands" of the employer, 8 and his statement, upon the
court's denial of the applicability of this defense, that "this proposition is
the rawest ever presented in a Court; '" 19 his vehement insistence on cate-
gorizing the employment agreements as "yellow dog" contracts ;2. and, most
serious of all, his claim that "we were hijacked through this Court all day
yesterday, and I tell you right now I don't intend to be hijacked all day
today." 21 The second specification alleges that Lamb was guilty of a dis-
respectful, threatening and intimidating attitude toward the court, and of
attempting to incite his clients against any adverse order that might be
rendered. To support this charge the committee relies chiefly upon Lamb's
oft-repeated statement that an injunction would not settle tile labor difficulties,
since "we are not through with the Williams Manufacturing Company.
'
The third specification accuses Lamb of making certain statements for the
purpose of stirring up ill-will, class hatred and violence. In addition to a
reiteration of previous items, the committee points in this connection to his
colorful description of strike-breaking methods;2 his definition and use of
the word "scab ;"24 a brief four line speech which elicited cheering and clap-
ping on the part of the spectators ;2 and his charge that a company witness
had turned "things over to his attorney to escape prosecution.120 Finally,
the fourth specification charges intentional discourtesy to the court, ungentle-
manly and unprofessional conduct, and an attempt to appeal to passion and
prejudice without regard to defending his clients' cause or assisting the court
and had been appointed to hear the case because the regular judge had disqualified
himselL
18. Record, Williams case, p. 2.
19. Record, Williams case, p. 127.
20. At the judge's sustaining the objection to the use of the phrase "yellow-dog"
contracts, Lamb replied, "I don't know how to label it. I know I can't think of a lower
or worse name." The judge also denied Lamb the right to refer to the contracts as
"individual contracts," but no objection was made when Lamb used this term imme-
diately thereafter. Both "yellow dog" and "individual contracts" were phrases subsequently
used by the judge himself. Record, Williams case, pp. 73, 74, 134, 148.
21. This remark followed the sustaining of an objection to Lamb's questioning of a
witness as to how the contracts had been obtained. The judge warned Lamb that if
he continued such conduct he would be subject to an investigation to determine if he
was a fit person to practice law. This constituted the only material varning the Court
gave to Lamb. Record, Williams case, p. 132.
Compare Lamb's remarks with those of Ford's counsel, cited in note 2, supra.
22. Record, Williams case, pp. 33, 37, 103. The "threat" was also phrased in the
following words, "Strike-breaking does not end the desire of human beings to secure
their social security." Record, Williams case, p. 104.
23. Record, Williams case, pp. 24-26, 28, 31, 105.
24. Record, Williams case, p. 63.
25. The outburst was seemingly provoked by an unnecessary remark by opposing
counsel. Record, Williams case, p. 139.
26. Lamb had asked to see the correspondence between the company and the NLRB,
which the witness testified was in his attorney's office in Cincinnati. This scame request
had been made on the previous day and plaintiffs had promised to produce it if possible.
Record, Williams case, p. 136.
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in reaching a fair decision. Under this finding the complaint repeats previous
quotations, cites various isolated inapt remarks, and stresses his indirect
indictment of a witness as a liar.27
Disbarment proceedings are not aimed at inflicting punishment upon an
individual for a wrong he has committed. This function is left to criminal
or civil processes. The purpose of disbarment, rather, is to insure respect for
the judicial process and to protect the interest of the general public by purg-
ing from the profession those attorneys who have demonstrated their in-
capacity to practice ethically. Any punitive effects are regarded as merely
incidental to the accomplishment of this larger purpose.28 So plentiful are
the less severe penalties at the disposal of the judge that the extreme sanction
of disbarment is usually reserved for conduct involving "moral turpitude."' 2 0
Hence disbarment has been most frequently employed against attorneys who
have committed serious crimes, 30 or have attempted to deceive the court',
or swindle their clients.3 2 In extreme cases, the elastic concept of "moral
turpitude" 3 has been stretched to include abusive criticism of the court in
briefs and other legal papers or in newspapers.3 4 But the reports are barren
of instances where a court has based a finding of moral turpitude solely upon
the conduct of counsel in litigating his case before the trial court; in fact,
the charge itself has been made but rarely.35 The distinction between conduct
27. A witness had testified that he was working against the union in order to keep
his job, but later denied having made this statement. Record, Williims case, pp. 83-86.
28. In re Huppe, 92 Mont. 211, 11 P. (2d) 793 (1932) ; In re Woodworth, 31 Ohio
N. P. (N.s.) 107 (C. P. 1933); State Board of Examiners v. Brown, 77 P. (2d) 626
(Wyo. 1938).
29. OHIO GEN. CODE ANx. (Page, 1937) § 1707. The complaint charged "moral
turpitude." See note 16, supra.
30. "It [moral turpitude] is subjective in meaning and restricted to those who com-
mit the gravest offenses-felonies, infamous crimes, those that are malum in se." Bartos
v. United States District Court, 19 F. (2d) 722, 724 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
31. In re Abrams, 36 Ohio App. 384, 173 N. E. 312 (1930). Compare In re French,
28 Hawaii 47 (1924) (attorney disbarred) with In re Zanger, 266 N. Y. 165, 194 N. E.
72 (1935) (attorney not disbarred), rev'g 241 App. Div. 60, 270 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1st
Dep't 1934).
32. State v. Rohrig, 159 Iowa 725, 139 N. W. 908 (1913).
33. "Moral turpitude" is incapable of precise definition. See Bradway, Moral Tur-
pitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment (1935) 24 CALIF. L. REV.
9, 16.
34. Bar Association of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 35 Cal. App. 460, 170 Pac. 440
(1917) ; In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N. E. 39 (1909) ; State v. Breckenridge, 126
Okl. 86, 258 Pac. 744 (1927) (suspension). But cf. In re Hickey, 149 Tenn. 344, 258
S. W. 417 (1924). Even in these cases a finding for contempt is more common. See
(1934) 8 Tamip. L. Q. 543.
35. In, re Sherwood, 259 Pa. 254, 103 Atl. 42 (1918) (reversing order of suspen-
sion) ; In re Dore, 165 Wash. 225, 4 P. (2d) 1107 (1931) (reversing order of suspen-
sion). But cf. In re Gross, 318 Pa. 143, 177 Atl. 767 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S.
645 (1935) (counsel disbarred; intent inferred from the reading of a slanderous written
document in open court) ; In re Macy, 109 Kan. 1, 196 Pac. 1095 (1921) (disbarment,
inter alla, for being drunk in court). But see Sharon v. Hill, 24 Fed. 726, 734 (C. C.
outside and inside the courtroom is readily apparent. The former cases repre-
sent premeditated atiacks upon courts which have repeatedly acknowledged
their willingness to be subjected to fair criticism if couched in courteous
language.36 But when an attorney blurts out improper statements in the
heat of combat in open court, the crucial element of deliberateness inherent
in the written word is missing,37 and further repetition can be checked by
an alert court. Therefore, only the most deliberately vicious and flagrantly
disgraceful language in oral argument could possibly justify imposition of the
concededly drastic penalty of disbarment.
Lamb's conduct in the Williams case falls far short of any such interpre-
tation of "moral turpitude." Some of the quoted statements seem entirely
innocuous; others represent minor eruptions invariably accompanying the
impassioned atmosphere of a labor controversy 8 For instance, his insistence
upon referring to the employment agreements as "yellow dog" contracts,
stressed in the complaint by repetitions of the same incident,3 0 is hardly an
outrageous perversion. The same phrase has been accepted by Congress,40
employed in judicial decisions,41 and recognized for its descriptive value by
respectable legal periodicals.42 His "threats" that an adverse decision by the
Ohio court would not terminate his clients' activities, while not meticulously ar-
ticulated, certainly do not warrant a finding of an attempt to incite to violence.
Rather, in the light of contemporaneous and subsequent events, a reasonable
interpretation is that the union intended to pursue before the NLRB a com-
plaint which had already been filed at the time of the injunction proceedings.
In this connection, it is significant that a recent decision by the NLRB found
the company guilty of unfair labor practices and enjoined the enforcement
of the contracts on the ground that they were exacted by coercion for the
express purpose of securing an injunction. 43 This condemnation of the com-
D. Cal. 1885) (Justice Field: "Any man, counsel or witness, who comes into a court of
justice armed, ought to be punished, and if he is a member of the bar, he ought to be
suspended or removed permanently.")
36. See State v. Breckenridge, 126 Old. 86, 89, 258 Pac. 744, 747 (1924); I re
Troy, 43 R. I. 279, 290, 111 AtL 723, 727 (1920).
37. Ex parte Morriss, 110 Tex. Crim. App. 585, 10 S. XV. (2d) 105 (1928); State
v. Rubin, 201 Wis. 30, 229 N. IV. 36 (1930). See 2 ToRN-rox, Arronmxns AT LAW
(1914) § 184. See note 2, supra.
38. See note 2, supra.
39. The same incident is reported three times in the complaint.
40. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 103 (1934).
41. See the dissenting opinions in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 27 (1915);
Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 305 Pa. 206, 238,
157 AtI. 588, 594 (1931).
42. See Doskow, Statutes Outlauing Yellow Dog Contracts (1931) 17 A. B. A J.
516; Comments (1932) 17 CoRN. L Q. 472; (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 770. Use of the
word "scab," incorporated in the Lamb charges, has been held to warrant a finding
for contempt State v. Zioncheck, 171 Wash. 388, 18 P. (2d) 35 (1933). But cf.
Ricard Boiler Co. v. Benner, 14 Ohio Dec. 357 (C. P. 1904).
43. In re Williams Manufacturing Co. and United Shoe Vorkers of America,
C-288, R-334, 6 NLRB No. 30 (March 24, 1938).
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pany indicates that Lamb's conduct was not lacking in good faith, and that
his arguments and accusations, though poorly extemporized, were motivated
by a desire to present a forceful defense of his clients' cause and to persuade
the Ohio court to make a just disposition of the case.44 If Lamb's demeanor
is thought to have descended at times to the level of an appeal to passion
and prejudice, surely the consequences could not be regarded as serious when
it is remembered that he was addressing an impartial court, not an impression-
able jury. And the accusation that an attorney can be responsible for stirring
up ill-will between the parties to a labor dispute overlooks the obvious truism
that strikes are always accompanied by bad feelings and aroused tempers.
The only serious impropriety would seem to be his caustic criticism of the
court. Even if these remarks were unprovoked, at most they called for a
reprimand, a warning, and, if repeated, a citation for contempt. But to
terminate, or even to suspend, the professional career of an attorney for
disrespect in oral argument would unduly emphasize courtroom manners at
the expense of denying to attorneys an opportunity to advance the best argu-
ments at their disposal. The enhancement of judicial dignity---certainly a
desirable end-will be more readily achieved if judges deserve, rather than
coerce, respect.
45
Doubt on the part of the committee itself as to the validity of the disbar-
ment proceedings may be inferred from a recent amendment to the complaint,
recommending that Lamb be found guilty of contempt if the charge of moral
turpitude should fail. But even this procedure would appear to be inappro-
priate at the present time. The purpose of direct contempt,4" as distinguished
from the protective function of disbarment, is primarily to vindicate the court,
punish the offending attorney, and eliminate troublesome impediments to a
speedy trial.47 A finding of direct contempt, moreover, requires a weighing
of intangible elements of demeanor observable only by the trial judge.
48
Since no separate hearing is required,40 it is therefore customary for the
presiding judge to resort to this sanction during the course of the trial.50
44. Moreover, sincere service to a cause which has been regarded by many as
unpopular has received recognition in disbarment proceedings as a mitigating circum-
stance. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934) (services rendered in behalf of the
rights of southern negroes). Lamb has been active in behalf of labor since 1933. Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, April 13, 1938, p. 5, col. 6.
45. Cf. Judicial Canon 11, American Bar Association.
46. Direct contempt, involved here, embraces acts committed in the presence of the
court. See THOMAS, PROBLEMS Or CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934) p. 3.
47. Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 1, 290 Pac. 293 (1930). See Beale, Con-
tempt of Court, Criminal and Civil (1908) 21 HARV. L. REV. 161.
48. Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 172 N. E. 209 (1930). Compare
Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912)
(only the court in which the contempt is committed may punish it), with Melton v.
Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 642, 170 S. W. 37 (1914) (where court is composed of several
districts, contempt against one is contempt against all).
49. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934) c. 1.
50. In re Grossman, 109 Cal. App. 625, 293 Pac. 683 (1930) (to impose contempt
immediately after trial is within reasonable time); In re Contempt of Cary, 165 Minn.
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While a fine for contempt might not have aroused critical comment if im-
posed at the trial, in the pending case contempt proceedings are being brought
more than nine months after the commission of the alleged wrongful acts.
A contempt conviction would therefore have no possible connection with
expediting the trial.51 At this late date, vindication of the court and punish-
ment of the offense could be adequately achieved by a reprimand from the
court and an apology by Lamb.
52
The disbarment proceedings against Lamb for his courtroom conduct in
the Williams case involve consequences even more serious than unjust cur-
tailment of a professional career. Rather than encouraging respect for law,
disbarment or suspension under present circumstances would indicate, to some
at least, the futility of hazarding a solution of basic social problems by acqui-
escence in the legal process. It would afford an additional weaponO against
attorneys appearing in defense of labor and civil liberties-more refined, it
is true, but no less devastating than some of the more! direct methods which
have been used to terrorize lawyers defending unpopular causes." It would
seriously restrict the bar's vital role of prestrving the democratic tradition of
representation for all causes, whatever their nature.
203, 206 N. W. 402 (1925) (court may wait until jury has retired); In re Thatcher,
80 Ohio St. 492, 89 N. E. 39 (1909) ("In not entertaining Specification 15 we do not wish
to be understood as holding that the facts therein stated show nothing that is repre-
hensible, but that it discloses a want of decorum which could have been adequately taken
care of at the time by the court in whose presence the conduct of the respondent oc-
curred.").
51. Compare In re Grossman, 109 Cal. App. 625, 293 Pac. 683 (1930); Waldman
v. Churchill, 262 N. Y. 247, 186 N. E. 690 (1933), with Ex parle Bullington, 66 Te.
Cr. 256, 145 S. NV. 1190 (1912); In re Stabler, 7 Alaska 186 (1924).
52. Cf. In re Dore, 165 Wash. 225, 4 P. (2d) 1107 (1931).
53. Cf. In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925) (disbarment for supporting
the I. W. NV.) ; see The Oakmar, 20 F. Supp. 650, 651 (D. Md. 1937) (in granting an
injunction ordering sitdown strikers off a vessel, Judge Coleman sharply reprimanded
union attorneys for defending the strikers).
54. A. L Wirin, labor attorney, vas kidnapped, beaten, and left in the desert
by Imperial Valley, Calif., vigilantes (Jan. 1934). David Levinson, International Labor
Defense attorney defending ten miners on murder charges growing out of a strike, was
kidnapped and severely blackjacked by Gallup, N. M., vigilantes (May, 1935). Henry
Paull, Minnesota attorney for Timber Workers Union, was beaten, kidnapped and aban-
doned by vigilantes of Ironwood, Michigan (July, 1937). C A. Stanfield, attorney for
three negroes, was physically mistreated and ejected from town before the trial in Forest
City, Arkansas (Oct., 1937). Further instances could be multiplied. (Information from
files of American Civil Liberties Union). See also description of maltreatment of Allan
Taub, attorney for International Labor Defense, in HAmAi MnTms SF'zX (1932) 320-
322, 330-338 (Dreiser Report on Terrorism in Kentucky Coal Fields).
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MISREPRESENTATION OF A QUESTION OF LAW AS A BASIS FOR ESTOPPEL
IN INSURANCE LAW*
INSURANCE COMPANIES commonly defend actions on their policies on the
ground that the insured committed an inceptional breach of contract. When
the insured seeks to negate this defense by parol evidence that the insurer's
agent had complete knowledge of the facts and had told the plaintiff that the
policy as issued protected him, a basic problem in insurance law is presented.'
It has received diverse treatment. The United States Supreme Court has
reversed its earlier position 2 and is now firmly committed to the proposition
that the admission of such testimony is violative of the parol evidence rule.*
But when the insured has entered into the transaction in good faith and
on the assumption that he is securing a valid policy, the application of this
doctrine creates hardship. Commentators have devised various theories by
which the opposite result may be supported.4 A frank recognition of an
exception to the parol evidence rule has been demanded.5 Since insurance
is a purchasable commodity, the familiar doctrine of sales law that the vendor
supplying a specific article impliedly warrants its suitability for its purpose
has been invoked. 6 Another approach stems from the rule that upon breach
by the insured, an insurance contract is not void but only voidable.7 It has
therefore been contended that issuance of the policy with knowledge of the
breach constitutes an election to affirm and not to avoid, which should be
operative to impose liability upon the insurer.8
*Ctauser v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co., 123 Conn. 413, 196 Atl. 137 (1937).
1. See generally 2 JoYcE, INsURANCE (2d ed. 1917) § 536; VANCE, INsURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 520; 3 WmisrtoN, CONTAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) §748; Comment (1920)
5 MINr. L Rxv. 136.
2. Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 (U. S. 1871) (parol evidence
admissible to create an equitable estoppel against the insurer).
3. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Building Ass'n, 183 U. S. 308 (1902);
Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U. S. 605 (1914); see VANCE, INsuRANcE (2d ed.
1930) § 136; Comment (1937) 25 GFo. L. J. 437. The status of this or any other
"federal rule" involving matters of general commercial law is left extremely dubious
by the Supreme Court's recent unequivocal reversal of Swift v. Tyson, in Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (April 25, 1938). See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. 3.
1336. The lower federal courts and the courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey follow
the Supreme Court. Boston Insurance Co. v. Hudson, 11 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 9th,
1926) ; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nance, 12 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; Kukusuza
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 276 Mass. 146, 176 N. E. 788 (1931); Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N. J. L. 568 (1878).
4. 3 Wnmusrox, CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. 1936) §§ 748-750; Langmaid, Waiver and
Estoppel In Insurance Law (1931) 20 CALiF. L. REv. 1.
5. 3 Wn.LisTro, CoNmAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 749. This argument is based on
the theory that since a policy of insurance is ordinarily made in a fixed form it is an
entirely natural and probable thing for the parties to make a separate oral agreement
rather than revise the terms of the printed policy.
6. See Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 203, 207.
7. Vance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 834, 851
et seq.
8. See Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Law (1928) 13 IowA L. REv. 129.
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Courts have rarely applied these theories. Less imaginative, perhaps, but
nonetheless eager to permit recovery to the insured, they have usually bot-
tomed their decisions on the more familiar doctrines of fraud,0 reformation, 0
waiver,11 and estoppel.12 The insurer rarely has actual intent to defraud, but
the acceptance of a premium with the imputed knowledge that the contract
is worthless to the insured may fairly be regarded as fraud by a court which
does not invariably insist that an actual wrongful intent be demonstrated.1 3
Reformation requires an untrue statement in the application or the policy
as a result of mutual mistake. The contract may then be reformed in equity
to express the real intent of the parties, and as a short cut an action at law
on the policy may be permitted. 14 But the theories most widely used to
permit recovery in this situation are waiver and estoppel. Commentators
make a clear distinction between the two concepts.15 Waiver contemplates
the relinquishment of a privilege or a power, and is said to be founded on
a substitute agreement between insured and agent which changes the terms
of the written contract. 6 The parol evidence rule should bar proof of any
such agreement made before or contemporaneously with the delivery of the
policy.1 The essential requisites of an equitable estoppel are the making of
a false statement of material fact by the insurer or his agent, the expectation
that it will be relied upon, and actual reliance by the insured to his detri-
ment."' Since estoppels were originally cognizable only in courts of equity,
the parol evidence rule should be relaxed even though the estoppel be claimed
in a proceeding at law.19 But the majority of courts, with little attempt at
either logical or historical analysis, treat the two terms as virtually symony-
9. Brown v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 849, 133 S. E. 260 (1926);
Micezey v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 273 Ill. App. 281 (1933); Eureka-Maryland
Assurance Corp. v. Scalco, 158 Md. 73, 148 Ad. 267 (1929).
10. Great American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 25 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) ; Back
v. Peoples' Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Atl. 603 (1922); Mancini v. Yorkshire
Ins. Co., 54 R. I. 79, 170 AtL 82 (1934).
11. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 226 Ala. 430, 147 So. 628 (1933); Columbia
Fire Ins. Co. v. Tatur, 46 Ga. App. 475, 167 S. E. 911 (1933) ; Automobile Ins. Exch.
v. Wilson, 144 Md. 253, 124 AUt. 876 (1923).
12. Broyles v. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co., 16 Tenn. App. 331, 64 S. V. (2d)
517 (1933) ; American Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 60 S. V. (2d) 1074 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) ;
Deitz v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 31 V. Va. 851, 8 S. E. 616 (1888); Pel:
v. Hartford Ass. & Indem. Co., 207 Wis. 344, 241 N. NV. 372 (1932).
13. 3 Wn yuSrO, CoNxaAcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) 2126.
14. Ibid. But see Great American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 25 F. (2d) 847, 848 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928).
15. See VANcE, INSUAN cE (2d ed. 1930) §§ 127-130; Comments (1937) 25 Gxo.
L. J. 437, (1920) 5 MINN. L REv. 135. But see RicuAnms, IusutmAcz (3d ed. 1916)
171.
16. Vance, supra hote 7, at 846.
17. Ibid. See Comment (1937) 25 Gmo. L. J. 437.
18. VANcE, IxsuRA(cE (2d ed. 1934) § 137.
19. Id. at § 140; Comment (1920) 5 -. L REv. 136. Contra: 3 ,Vnusio.;,
CONTmACrS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 750.
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mous and allow the introduction of parol evidence indiscriminately.2 0 Even
where the concepts are ostensibly differentiated they are often employed in
factual situations in which their application can with difficulty be justified
on any other ground than the general principle that the insured should be
permitted a recovery.
2'
A recent Connecticut case presents a recurrent factual set-up in which the
doctrine of equitable estoppel has generally been employed with but little
discussion of the soundness of the premises implicit in its use. The plaintiff
purchased property with buildings thereon and took the deed in the natwi
of a third person. When the former sought to have the existing fire insur-
ance transferred, the agent of the defendant company, cognizant of all the
facts, informed him that the insurance would have to be in the name of the
record owner. The agent was aware that the plaintiff was not only the equit-
able owner but would also be the real insured, paying all premiums and
suffering all loss in case of fire. But apparently the agent thought and assured
the plaintiff that the policy written in the name of the record owner would
cover the risk. The record owner subsequently conveyed the property to
the plaintiff by an unrecorded deed. After fire occurred, the defendant denied
liability on the ground that the plaintiff was not the insured under the policy
and that there had been an inceptional breach of the "sole and unconditional
ownership" clause. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. The court
held that because of the knowledge and acts of its agent, the insurer was
equitably estopped from preventing parol proof by the plaintiff that he was
the owner of the equitable title, and that as such the latter satisfied the sole
and unconditional ownership requirement. Further support for the decision
was marshalled on the theory that the plaintiff should be allowed to sue as a
beneficiary of the purchase-money resulting trust which arose by virtue, of
the dealings between the plaintiff and the record owner of the property.
22
20. Yorkshire Ins. Co. v. Gazis, 219 Ala. 96, 121 So. 84 (1929); Aldridge v.
Greensboro Fire Ins. Co., 194 N. C. 683, 140 S. E. 706 (1927) ; Bardwell v. Commercial
Union Assurance Co., 105 Vt. 106, 163 Atl. 633 (1933) ; see Vance, supra note 7, at 839.
New York has the unique rule that the insurer cannot be estopped from relying on
a breach of warranty but can be estopped in the case of a breach of condition. Satz v.
Mass. Bonding and Ins. Co., 243 N. Y. 385, 153 N. E. 844 (1926), (1927) 75 U. or
PA. L. REv. 477.
Limitations on the actual authority of an agent do not usually prevent the insured
from establishing an estoppel, but it has been held that knowledge of a soliciting agent
cannot bind the insurer. Salvate v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 42 R. I. 433, 108 Atl. 579 (1920).
The general stipulation that no agent has any authority to waive any of the provisions
in the policy unless the waiver is written thereon or countersigned by some higher
authority is uniformly held to refer to facts which may arise after the policy is written
and not retroactively to those existing before or at the time of the execution of tie
contract. MacKay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 538, 173 Atl. 783 (1934); Bible
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (1931).
21. Mackay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 538, 173 Adl. 783 (1934); United
States Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 237 Ky. 43, 34 S. W. (2d) 938 (1931).
22. Chauser v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 123 Conn. 413, 196 Atl. 137 (1937).
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Traditionally, the representation requisite for the creation of an equitable
estoppel had to be a material fact and not an opinion or a conclusion of law.p
In the case of an opinion the truth was deemed to be uncertain, 2' and in the
case of a conclusion of law the parties were presumed to have equal knowl-
edge.Y Reasonable grounds for reliance on such representations were there-
fore lacking. The only representation made by the agent in the instant case
was that the policy as written covered the plaintiff's risk. Even though the
distinction between lav and fact is not easily discernible,20 it would nonethe-
less appear that the interpretation of the operative effect of the policy is a
conclusion of law.27 This incipient obstacle to the creation of an equitable
estoppel has of course been rationalized. The agent, it is true, states his
opinion in good faith. But his acts and knowledge are imputed to the com-
pany. The latter knows that a condition broken makes the policy unenforce-
able. When, therefore, it assures the plaintiff through its agent that he will
be protected, it misstates the material fact of what its opinion actually is, and
the basis for the estoppel springs into being.28 This ingenious explanation
has met severe criticism.29
The majority of courts have not been overly bothered by such conceptual
difficulties, and the problem has received meager treatment at their hands.
It is generally stated, without question or discussion, that a representation
such as the one involved in the instant situation is sufficient to support an
estoppel.30 But there have been sporadic indications of dissent. It has been
held that a soliciting agent is not an agent to give legal advice. He therefore
cannot bind the company by any statement as to the necessity of making
changes in a policy3 ' or by a statement that a policy will be valid despite the
breach of a warranty by the insured.3 2 And a statement by a general agent
23. BowER, ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION (1923) §§40, 57; BiGELOWv, ESTOPPEL
(5th ed. 1890) 572.
24. BIGELOW, EsTOPPE. (5th ed. 1890) 573.
25. WVest London Commercial Bank v. Kitson, 13 Q. B. D. 360 (1834) ; see BIGELoV,,
ESTOPPEL (5th ed. 1890) 573; BOWER, ESTOPPEL By REPRESENTATION (1923) § 55.
26. Bow.R, ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION (1923) §56; THAVER, EvIzENcE (1898)
202; (1924) 2 TEx. L. Ray. 361.
27. Cf. Prophet v. Roberts [1918] 88 L. J. 975 (C. A.) (statement by employer to
workman as to legal effect of a clause in Workmen's Compensation Act held to be
conclusion of law and not ground for an estoppel) ; see Langmaid, supra note 4, at 7.
28. VANCE, INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) 520.
29. See Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Law (1926) 35 YALE L J. 970; Langmaid,
supra note 4, at 6.
30. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 226 Ala. 430, 147 So. 628 (1933) ; State Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Latourette, 71 Ark. 242, 74 S. IV. 300 (1903) ; Scott v. Law, Union & Rock
Ins. Co., 12 S. W. (2d) 147 (Tex. Comm. App. 19-9) ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Nash,
67" S. XV. (2d) 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
31. Neiman v. Hawkeye Securities Fire Ins. Co., 205 Iowa 119, 217 N. W. 258
(1928).
32. Dryer v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 94 Iowa 471, 62 N. W. 798 (1895).
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that the application was a mere matter of form has been held to be an ex-
pression of opinion which could in no way mislead the applicant.,3
The refusal of most courts to deny recovery to the insured on the basis
of tenuous distinctions between questions of law and fact is hardly open to
serious criticism. Where the agent acts in good faith, and the insured believes
his word, the frank admission and application of an exception to the rule
that a statement of law will not support an estoppel seems eminently justified.
The inclination of the company to adopt a fast-and-loose policy, as evidenced
by its denial of liability to the named insured previous to the institution of
the present suit, reinforces this conclusion. It has been stated that if the
representor stands in a confidential relation to the other party, or chooses
to make the statement as a matter within his own personal knowledge, his
statement may be considered a representation making him liable to an estop-
pel.3 4 The insurance agent is usually held out to be the qualified representative
of the company, and the average person feels, rightly or wrongly, that the
former has a superior knowledge of the factors necessary to the creation of
a valid contract.3 5 To impose a duty on the insurer to provide agents with
that knowledge seems a not undue requirement.
Another solution is perhaps feasible in situations analogous to the instant
case. The court indicated that a purchase-money resulting trust in the land
was raised in favor of the plaintiff. But since the latter paid all the premiums
and was the real insured, it would follow that he was also the beneficiary
of a resulting trust in the policy itself.3 6 The rule that a cause of action
against a third party must be prosecuted by the trustee and not the cestui
does not apply to passive trusts of this nature."7 The trustee, as holder of
the legal title, could presumably satisfy the unconditional ownership require-
ment and recover against the company.38 If he did so, he could be forced to
remit the proceeds to the instant plaintiff. Permitting the latter to establish
the trust directly against the company, perhaps by joining the named insured
as a party-defendant, would avoid possible circuity of action. It would also
33. Southern Ins. Co. v. White, 58 Ark. 277, 24 S. W. 425 (1893) ; see Swereign
Camp, W.O.W. v. Richardson, 151 Ark. 231, 237, 236 S. W. 278, 280 (1922); 2 JoYCE,
INsURANcE (2d ed. 1917) 1329. Some courts, admitting that the statements of the
agent were conclusions of law, have nevertheless applied the doctrine of estoppel. Pacific
Employers' Ins. Co. v. Arenbrurst, 85 Cal. App. 263, 259 Pac. 121 (1927); Forney v.
Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 181 Minn. 8, 231 N. W. 401 (1930).
34. BIGELow, EsToPPEL (5th ed. 1890) 572; BowER, ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION
(1923) § 51.
35. See American Ins. Co. v. Inzer, 216 Ala. 553, 554, 114 So. 187, 188 (1927);
Headley's Express & Storage Co. v. Pennsylvania Indem. Corp., 319 Pa. 240, 245,
178 AtI. 816, 818 (1927); 2 JoYcE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) 1228; VANCE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1930) 525-528.
36. Purchase-money resulting trusts are not confined to realty. 1 PERRy, TRUsTS
AND TRusTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 130. See Rider v. Kidder, 10 Ves. 363, 367 (Ch. 1805).
37. 4 BOGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEES (1935) §§ 453, 870.
38. But the peculiar circumstance of the reconveyance of the legal title to the




accomplish the ultimate objective without the necessity of dealing with the
troublesome problems inherent in the application of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.3 9
REGULATION OF THE MILLING-IN-TRANSIT PRIVILEGE BY THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION*
TRANSIT privileges evolved' largely through the voluntary action of rail-
roads in a competitive effort to encourage industrial development along their
lines 2 and to assure for themselves control of the outbound movement of ship-
ments.3 They are now extensively granted on a variety of commodities. 4 An
illustration of the privilege in simple form is that of a miller at B, an inter-
mediate point on a railroad line, who ships wheat from A to B, there mills it,
and then ships the product to a market at C at the through rate from A to
C, rather than the higher combination of locals which would otherwise apply.5
Use of the through rate is based on a fiction of one continuous shipment.0
Actually, the shipper pays the local rate to the transit point, and upon sur-
39. Parol evidence is freely admissible to prove a resulting trust. I Pomn, TnusTs
AND TRusTEEs (7th ed. 1929) §§ 137, 138. Cf. Pearlstine v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 74 S. C.
246, 54 S. E. 372 (1906) (suit brought jointly by the named insured as trustee aind by
the real insured as beneficiary).
*Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. v. Abilene & Southern Ry., 206 L C. C. 355 (1935) ; Larabee
Flour Mills Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 223 I. C. C. 55 (1937).
1. The first transit privilege in this country was inaugurated about 1870. See Dun-
can & Co. v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 35 I. C. C. 477, 480 (1915).
2. See VANDERBLUE & BURGESs, RAILROADS: RATES-SERNICE- A AGr EMET (1923)
138; PIcKErr & VAn.E, THE DECLINE oF NORTHWESTERN FLoUR MIU.ING (1933) 55.
3. See In the fatter of Substitution of Tonnage at Transit Points, 18 I. C. C. 280,
295 (1910). But it is unreasonable for a railroad to increase its local rate as a penalty
to be forfeited if the outbound shipment does not move on its line. Red River Oil Co.
v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 23 I. C. C. 438 (1912).
4. See In the Matter of the Transportation of Wool, Hides and Pelts, 23 I. C. C.
151, 174 (1912); Superior Commercial Club v. Great Northern IR., 24 1. C. C 96
(1912). The number of transit arrangements extant in this country has been estimated
at over 300. WILsON, TRANsrr SERvicEs AND Paivn.x.Es (1925) 81. Transit seems
most widely used on grain, pafticularly wheat, at least a half of which receives such
service as storage, cleaning, milling, or inspection, and on cotton for the purpose of
compression and grading. See Grain and Grain Products, 164 I. C. C. 619, 700 (1930).
See FREIGH3T TRAFFIc REDEOOx (1935) 284 et seq. for a summary of the nature and kind
of transit privileges.
5. Ordinarily the through rate is less than the sum of the intermediate rates. See
In the Matter of Transportation of Wool, Hides and Pelts, 23 1. C. C. 151. 170 (1912).
6. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Ann Arbor R.R., 39 I. C. C. 643 (1916); Kansas
City Board of Trade v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 69 I. C. C. 185 (1922). But cf.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 768 (1929) (refusal to npply
fiction of through shipment with transit privilege in determining the reasonableness of
certain proportional rates).
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render of inbound billing at the time of the outbound shipment, pays the
difference between such local rate and the through rate from point of origin
to final destination. 7 And although logical adherence to the fiction of a through
movement would require the shipment of a product derived from the identi-
cal raw material moved inbound, different shipments have regularly been
commingled as a natural incident of the processing which takes place at the
transit point.8 The transit privilege has thus tended to place intermediate
points on a rate equality with producing points and market centers in the
competition for the business of processing raw materials.
Treatment of transit practices and arrangements by the Interstate Commerce
Commission has been rather fragmentary in nature. When first called
upon to consider them, the Commission expressed doubts concerning their
legality.' 0 But rapid extension of the practice of granting these privileges
soon entailed recognition that the railroads, in the absence of unjust dis-
crimination or undue prejudice, should be permitted to grant or refuse them
in their discretion."' The affirmative power to order the establishment of
transit privileges, included by implication in the 1906 and subsequent amend-
ments to the Interstate Commerce Act,' 2 has never been exercised,' 3 but
abuses in transit practice have been the subject of remedial action and sug-
gested regulation. Thus the Commission has ordered a reasonable limitation
on the granting of out-of-line and back hauls without a separate charge in
connection with transit,14 and has approved the adoption of the "three-way
rule" which provides that the through rate to final destination will be the
7. This difference is known as the transit balance. Grain and Grain Products, 164
I. C. C. 619, 633 (1930).
8. 'See Transit Case, 24 I. C. C. 340, 350 (1912). Compare Grain and Grain
Products, 164 I. C. C. 619, 656 (1930), with Grain and Grain Products, 173 I. C. C.
511, 530 (1931).
9. See Loc.I N, EcoNomics OF TRANSPORTATION (1935) 123.
10. See Crews v. The Richmond and Danville R.R. I I. C. C. 401, 424-425 (1888).
11. Douglas & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 21 1. C. C. 97 (1911); Young &
Cutsinger v. Louisville & N. R. R., 22 I. C. C. 1 (1911).
12. Prior to 1906, the Commission's power to regulate transit was doubtful and it
would not compel carriers to accord the privilege. Diamond Mills v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 9 I. C. C. 311 (1902). But §§ 1, 6, and 15 of the Amended Act conferred suffi-
ciently broad powers on the Commission to warrant full control over the practice. Central
R.R. of N. J. v. United States, 257 U. S. 247 (1921) ; In re Transportation of Wool,
Hides, and Pelts, 23 I. C. C. 151 (1912) ; Speigle v. Southern Ry., 25 I. C. C. 71 (1912).
13. The Commission has repeatedly said that its policy is to refuse to order the
establishment of transit privileges. See Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry., 20 I. C. C. 43, 47-48 (1910); Montgomery Cotton Exchange v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 112 I. C. C. 325, 332-333 (1926). Cf. Keery v. New York, 0. & WV. Ry.,
226 I. C. C. 335 (1938) ; Southern Hardwood Traffic Ass'n v. Director General, 611. C. C.
132 (1921); Flory Milling Co. v. Central N. E. Ry., 93 I. C. C. 129 (1924).
14. Out-of-Route and Back-Haul Charges on Bran or Middlings, 169 I. C. C. 105
(1930); see In the Matter of Alleged Unlawful Rates and Practices, 7 I. C. C. 240,
243 (1897) ; Stock & Sons v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 31 I. C. C. 150, 153 (1914) ;
KUHLMANN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLOUR-MILLING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES (1929) 173.
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highest of three rates, namely, from origin to transit point, transit point to
destination, and origin to destination. The storage in transport of manufac-
tured products of grain which require no further processing after leaving
the point of origin or intermediate transit point has been held not to be a
legitimate function of the transit privilege., In addition, the Commission
has attempted to prevent the use of surplus billing' 7 to accomplish the substi-
tution and forwarding on the transit billing of local commodities by requiring
the daily cancellation of all billing which does not represent a transit com-
modity actually at hand and awaiting shipment.18 However, despite the possi-
bility of frequent abuse of transit privileges and their tendency to disorganize
the rate structure,19 remedial measures have in the past stopped short of
securing discontinuance of the practice.20
Two recent cases leave the status of the milling-in-transit privilege in un-
certainty. In Rudy-Patrick Seed Company v. Abilene & Southern Railway,4
a charge of unreasonable rates was denied. The Commission held that the use
of split billing, whereby an outbound carload of millet seed was made up of
portions of inbound carloads from different points of origin, made the out-
bound shipment in effect a number of less-than-carload quantities not entitled
to the benefit of a through carload rate. This approach seems to overlook the
fact that the 1. c. 1. quantities of tonnage actually moved to and from the
transit point as parts of carload shipments, with carload economy, rather than
with the added expenses of I. c. 1. traffic. This ruling was regarded by many
shippers as being destructive of all transit, and, accordingly, the complainant
in Larabee Flour Mills Company v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,
with the cooperation of many large millers, utilized an apparently simple
reparation case to seek a review of the Rudy-Patrick decision. It was desired
to have a determination of the applicability of that holding to grain and
grain products, where the single-origin single-destination rule enunciated
in the earlier case would work particular hardship because of the neces-
sity in the manufacture of flour of securing a blend of wheat drawn from
different points of origin.23 The Commission, without overruling the Rudy-
15. Grain and Grain Products, 205 I. C. C. 301, 413 (1934).
16. Grain and Grain Products, 164 L C. C. 619, 657 (1930).
17. Surplus billing is accumulated by reason of local consumption, by less-than-
carload non-transit movements out, etc. See Transit Case, 24 I. C. C. 340, 343 (1912).
1M Transit Case, 24 I. C. C. 340 (1912); see In re Substitution of Tonnage at
Transit Points, 18 I. C. C. 280, 294 (1910).
19. See Grain and Grain Products, 164 I. C. C. 619, 644-645 (1930).
20. But the Commission has usually been reluctant to authorize the extension of
transit privileges. See Schmidt & Sons v. Michigan Central R.R., 19 1. C C. 535 (1910) ;
Middletown Car Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 I. C.C. 185, 186 (1914); cf. Transit
Grain in St. Louis District, 223 I.C.C. 556 (1937).
21. 206 I.C.C. 355 (1935).
22. 223 I. C. C. 55 (1937).
23. Id. at 62. Complainant also sought to prove that the inequality of the average
inbound weight of wheat and the outbound weight of the product, as well as numerous
other related factors, showed the impracticability of complying with the principles of
the Rudy-Patrick case.
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Patrick decision, recognized the impracticability of prohibiting the use of all
split billing, but emphasized its abuses and the desirability of a "single balance"
outbound carload. 24 Reparation was nevertheless denied because there had
been no showing that the rates on shipments of wheat milled in transit were
unreasonable as compared to the rates on non-transited shipments.
In denying reparation in the Larabee case, the Commission failed to indi-
cate whether it was substituting for the Rudy-Patrick doctrine a new basis
for denying reparation in transit cases or whether it was merely offering an
alternative. Yet a common but unarticulated basis for both decisions may be
found in the probable intent of the Commission to favor a cost of service
doctrine. It expressly stated in the Larabee case that an award of reparation
on transited shipments would ignore the actual transportation service ren-
dered, for the use of split billing only adds to the cost of the service.2 5 As a
result of the Larabee decision, therefore, no complaint against the carriers
for replacing the privilege with a special charge would seem sustainable, since
the extra expense of handling,26 accounting,27 and policing 28 makes it im-
possible in any case to show that transit service is less costly than the service
connected with separate movements to and from the transit point.29
Although the Commission gave no indication of requiring the withdrawal
of transit privileges because of their unremunerative nature, it is not un-
natural, in view of increasing concern over depleted railroad revenues,3 0 to
find an attempt to look beyond the fiction of the through movement to the
cost of the actual service rendered.3 1 And it is perhaps only fair not to
24. See Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 223 I. C. C. 55, 71
(1937) (Commissioner Eastman and three others dissenting). Subsequent to the Rudy-
Patrick decision, western carriers revised their transit rules to limit the number of
pieces of inbound billing usable against an outbound shipment. Whether this action con-
stitutes sufficient compliance with the principles of that case remains undecided.
25. See Surrendered Tonnage Slips at Transit Points, 77 I. C. C. 239, 240 (1923).
26. In a single origin single destination shipment alone, transit necessitates four
switching movements at the transit point. See Fabrication-In-Transit Charges, 29
I. C. C. 70, 78 (1914). The number of movements obviously is greatly increased with
additional tonnage slips.
27. For a description of the accounting processes required, see Surrendered Tonnage
Slips at Transit Points, 77 I. C. C. 239, 240 (1923).
28. The duty of carefully policing transit privileges is on the carriers. In re Substi-
tution of Tonnage at Transit Points, 18 I. C. C. 280, 296 (1910).
29. See Transit Rules on Grain, 98 I. C. C. 679, 682 (1925).
30. General Commodity Rate Increase, 223 I. C. C. 657 (1937); In the Matter of
Increases in Rates, Fares, and Charges, 226 I. C. C. 41 (1938).
31. In -the past, the carriers have not generally assessed a separate transit charge
[See Tonnxage Slips at Transit Points, 77 I. C. C. 239 (1923)] except in the Northwest
where lack of competition and a desire to encourage the movement of wheat rather than
flour was the motivating force. See Grain and Grain Products, 164 I. C. C. 619, 654
(1930). But the Commission has sustained those instances where reasonable charges
were imposed. Stock & Sons v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 31 L.C. C. 150 (1914).
The Supreme Court reversed the Commission in one case for holding that only the actual
cost of the service may be charged. Southern Ry. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 214 U. S. 297
(1909) (reasonable profit may be charged). The Commission and its individual members
include any part of this cost in the regular line-haul rates, where it must be
borne by all shippers of the commodity, and to require solely those who use
the service to pay for it.32 On the other hand, since millers located at inter-
mediate points depend to a large extent on the prevailing transit practice and
have established businesses in reliance thereon,33 it might be ill-advised 4 to
charge them the actual cost of the service, which probably would be sufficiently
high to place them at a serious disadvantage in relation to mills at market
points.3 5 The Interstate Commerce Commission, however, is under no duty
to protect property value based on the enjoyment of the transit privilege,30 or
to compel maintenance of rate schedules for the purposes of equalizing com-
petitive conditions and assuring geographical distribution of manufactures3 T
The ultimate decision would seem to lie with the railroads themselves. Under
present conditions they are unlikely to effect wholesale withdrawal of the
transit privilege in the grain trade by insisting on cost of servicePs The grow-
ing diversion of freight traffic to highway trucking has already forced rail car-
riers to resort to the attraction of better and cheaper service,30 and the pressure
of competition between lines will undoubtedly exert a similar deterring in-
fluence.
have often stated that the carriers should exact a reasonable charge for the extra service.
See In re Transportation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts, 23 1. C. C. 151, 174 (1912) ; Grain
and Grain Products, 164 I. C.C. 619, 708 (1930).
32. Mercantile Lumber Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 53 I. C. C. 663 (1919) ; see con-
curring opinions in Grain Case Modifications, 223 I. C. C. 235, 246 (1937).
33. See Picnrr & VAu.r, op. cit. supra note 2, at 54.
34. The Commission has often said that transit is a commercial necessity because of
its widespread application and the large investment based upon its continuance. See
In re Transportation of Wool, Hides, and Pelts, 23 . C. C. 151, 171 (1912) ; The Transit
Case, 24 I. C. C. 340, 349 (1912).
35. Since terminal costs constitute such a large part of the total cost of shipment,
an assessment for the same might effectively discourage the use of the privilege and
result in the decline of milling at interior points. See KuHLixAm, op. cit. mipra note 14,
at 175 (a main factor in the decline of Minneapolis milling in the past was the with-
drawal of the milling-in-transit privilege).
36. Douglas & Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 21 I. C.C. 97 (1911).
37. The Commission has frequently stated that it is not its function to equalize
economic conditions. See Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.,
22 I. C. C. 596, 603 (1912); Port Arthur Board of Trade v. Abilene & So. Ry., 27
I. C. C. 388, 402 (1913).
38. A petition by carriers in the western district for permission to grant three free
stops in transit instead of the two previously prescribed by the Commission was recently
granted. Grain and Grain Products, 223 1. C. C. 235 (1937).
39. See (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1420 (pick-up and delivery service).
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EQUITY DECREE DETERMINING INTERESTS IN EXTRATERRITORIAL LAND *
PLAINTIFF mortgagor sued his mortgagee for an accounting in the Fed-
eral District Court of Vermont, claiming that mortgage notes on Maine timber
land had been paid in full. The defendant bank, a resident of New Hamp-
shire, entered a general appearance. After hearings had been in progress for
some time, the plaintiff petitioned that an interlocutory decree be framed to
approve a contract to cut the timber, enjoin the defendant from interfering
by litigation or otherwise with the performance of the contract, and appoint
a receiver to superintend operations and handle profits pending the" outcome
of the accounting proceedings. Upon finding that delay in cutting the timber
would cause waste, that the contract was a reasonable one, and that the mort-
gage notes had been fully paid so that the bank had no further interest in the
property, the District Court granted the interlocutory decree. The Circuit
Court of Appeals1 approved the appointment of the receiver, but decided that
the court had no "jurisdiction" over the Maine property and hence had no
power to approve the contract or issue the injunction.
2
A court administering equitable relief traditionally has power to act when
it has personal jurisdiction over the parties before it.3 But in theory the
court may, in its discretion, refuse to exercise its power. Such refusal is often
termed "lack of jurisdiction," even though were the court to invoke its author-
ity the resulting decree would be enforceable and not a mere nullity.4 Whether
courts in certain instances actually exercise complete discretion in deciding
whether to grant relief is doubtful.5 The tendency, rather, has been for courts
to limit their freedom in each situation according to generalizations reiterated
in preceding cases. This trend is noticeable in those decisions in which an
equity decree purports to control a defendant's activities outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the court. If the facts of the case initially present proper
grounds for equitable relief, courts will generally enjoin a defendant from
doing an act in another state,6 but they have been reluctant to issue a decree
which would compel him to perform so-called affirmative acts in that state,
7
even though in the opinion of commentators there is little practical reason for
* Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, 92 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 58 Sup. Ct. 271 (U. S. 1937).
1. Appeal from interlocutory rulings which grant or refuse injunctions or appoint
receivers is provided for by 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 227 (1934).
2. Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, 92 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 58 Sup. Ct. 271 (1937).
3. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1937) § 9; cf. 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRU-
DENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 134, 135, 170.
4. See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY (1936) § 38; Cook, Powers of a Court of Equity
(1915) 15 CoL. L. REv. 106, 107.
5. See CLARK, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 15.
6. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v.
Worster, 23 N. H. 462 (1851) ; see RESTATEMENT, CoNFLicr OF LAWS (1934) § 97.
7. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1908); Gunter v. Arling-
ton, 271 Mass. 314, 171 N. E. 486 (1930); New York v. Central R. R., 42 N. Y. 283
(1870). But cf. Vineland Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water
Co., 245 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917).
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the distinction.8 The same constrictive use of the court's discretionary power
is again apparent when the issues involve interests in foreign land. Then the
power to exercise control over the person of the defendant dashes with the
fundamental doctrine that control of all property within a state's borders is
vested in the courts of that state. But the rule that only the courts of the
situs may exercise jurisdiction over property interests ° is not inexorable and
is subject to certain recognized exceptions. These have been expressed in
terms of the much repeated generalization that where the defendant is under
a personal obligation with respect to the property, courts of equity will en-
force that obligation regardless of the location of the res."1 Included in this
category are contracts to convey land,' 2 express or implied trusts,1 3 suits for
an accounting, 4 cases involving fraud,15 and bills to redeem or foreclose mort-
gages.1 6 A number of cases, moreover, have broken through the formula and
granted a negative injunction despite the lack of a personal obligation.17
Though these authorities were available, the court in the instant case found no
personal obligation to exist, and felt constrained to follow the orthodox deci-
sions.
A more realistic approach would look beyond generalizations to the ulti-
mate enforceable effect that a decree might have if issued. There is always
8. See Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Pcr.sons to Compel the
Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State (1930) 14 MInr. L REv. 494,
517 et seq.; (1922) 35 HARv. L. RE%% 610; (1926) 20 Iti. I. REv. 594; (1930) 30 Coi
L. REv. 1178.
9. Cf. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Coulthard v. Davis, 151
Iowa 578, 131 N. W. 10,8 (1911); Wilmer v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
130 Md. 666, 101 Atl. 538 (1917) ; see Cook, mspra note 4, at 134 et seq.
10. Northern Indiana R. R. v. Michigan Central R. IL, 15 How. 233 (U. S. 1853);
Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87 (1891); Caldwell v. Newton, 99 Ka. 846, 163 Par.
163 (1917) ; see I PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 298.
11. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148 (U. S. 1810); see Phelps v. MacDonald, 99 U. S.
298, 308 (1878); 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1384; 1 PouEnov, op. cit.
mpra note 3, at § 298.
12. Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sr. 445 (1750); Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148
(U. S. 1810) ; Hansen v. Duvall, 333 Mo. 59, 62 S. NV. (2d) 732 (1933) ; cf. Anderson-
Tully Co. v. Thompson, 132 Tenn. 80, 177 S. V. 66 (1915).
13. Kildare v. Eustace, 1 Vern. 419 (1686) ; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327 (1860);
Smyrna Theatre Co. v. Missir, 198 App. Div. 181, 189 N. Y. Supp. 4 (2d Dep't 1921).
14. La Varre v. Hall, 42 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Wood v. Warner, 15 N. J.
Eq. 81 (CI. 1862); see Crocker v. Howland, 144 Ore. 223, 225, 24 P. (2d) 327, 328
(1933). But cf. Wilmer v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 130 Md. 665, 101
Atl. 538 (1917).
15. Arglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 75, 135 (1682); Lord Cranstown v. Johnston, 3
Ves. Jr. 170 (1796).
16. Toler v. Carteret, 2 Vern. 494 (1705); Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876);
cf. Lamldn v. Lovell, 176 Ala. 334, 58 So. 258 (1912) (cancellation of a mortgage). But
cf. Eaton v. McCall, 86 Me. 346, 29 Ati. 1103 (1894).
17. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Alexander v. Tolleston Club,
110 I11. 65 (1884); Coulthard v. Davis, 151 Iowa 578, 131 N. W. 1038 (1911); see Mess-
ner, supra note 8, at 514.
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the possibility that the defendant will voluntarily obey.18 If he refused, the
court might be able to enforce obedience by contempt or sequestration pro-
ceedings aimed at local property.19 Yet since the defendant is a non-resident,
these methods would perhaps be ineffective in the present case. There is then
presented the more serious problem of whether the plaintiff would be able to
invoke the aid of courts in other jurisdictions to enforce the decree. The
Supreme Court of the United States held in Fall v. Eastin20 that the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution does not compel the court of
the situs to put into effect a foreign decree affecting local property interests.
21
If the defendant did not obey the district court's decree, the plaintiff might
have to relitigate all the issues in the courts of the situs. But several juris-
dictions have regarded the decrees of other states as binding upon them with-
out constitutional compulsion.2 2 And even if the decree itself were not given
full faith and credit, some authority declares that the findings of fact of the
first court must be treated as res judicata by the courts of other jurisdic-
tions.23 Since there is a distinct probability that the decree may be enforced
or at least given some lesser effect in another court, mere doubt concerning
its recognition should not deter its issuance.
Especially does a decree seem reasonable where the equities, as in the
instant case, so favor the granting of immediate relief. The petition for the
interlocutory order sought to protect the property pending the outcome of the
original action. The lower court found that the timber should be cut immedi-
ately in order to prevent waste and realize the land's full value, and that the
mortgagor -had fullr paid his mortgage obligations. Not only do these facts
clearly make out a case for relief, but by refusing to grant the interlocutory
decree, the court is denying the plaintiff his only available remedy unless he
can institute new proceedings in Maine. Even if the latter course were pos-
sible, it might be of little value where speedy relief is so essential to the pro-
tection of the plaintiff's interests. Finally, despite its reluctance to determine
interests in foreign lands, the Circuit Court of Appeals tacitly approved the
bringing of the original proceedings in the Vermont District Court by affirm-
ing the interlocutory decree insofar as it appoints a receiver, even though
18. Steele v. Bryant, 132 Ky. 569, 116 S. W. 755 (1909) ; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1927) §207; Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree
(1919) 17 MICH. L. REv. 527, 549.
19. See McCLINTOcK, EQUITY (1936) §§ 16, 17; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith
and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land (1925) 34
YALE L. J. 591, 608; Comment (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 946, 947.
20. 215 U. S. 1 (1909).
21. Equitable decrees for the payment of money, however, must be given full faith
and credit by other states. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65 (U. S. 1853); Sistare v.
Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910).
22. Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 607, 173 N. W. 127 (1919) ; Dunlap v. Byers, 110
Mich. 109, 67 N. W. 1067 (1896) ; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873) ; Mal-
lette v. Scheerer, 164 Wis. 415, 160 N. W. 182 (1916). Commentators approve the views
expressed in these cases. See Cook, supra note 4, at 228 et seq.; Lorenzen, supra note 19,
at 598; Messner, supra note 8, at 528.
23. Redwood Inv. Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973 (1923); see Gooa-
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) § 207; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 449.
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standing alone his appointment to supervise the contract appears to be a fruit-
less gesture.24 Inasmuch as the lower court had jurisdiction over the original
action and made findings of fact which might be treated as res judicata even
by the courts of the situs, it should have been permitted to protect the interests
of the parties during the complete course of litigation.
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES BY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE*
A CALIFORNIA statute permitted -any litigant one peremptory challenge of
the judge slated to hear any proceeding pending in a superior or muniqipal
court. Without further action or proof of disqualification by the challenger, the
presiding county judge is obliged to assign another judge to the case.1 The
statute was recently declared unconstitutional as an excessive delegation of
legislative power, on the ground that it enabled an individual litigant to inter-
fere unlawfully with the constitutional prerogatives of the courts.2
The contrasting attitudes of the California legislature and judiciary typify
the two divergent philosophies which explain in large measure the varied
status of judicial disqualification in the United States. Those states making
it difficult to disqualify a judge rely upon the broad premise that the dignity
and purity of the judiciary can best be preserved by infrequent disqualifica-
tion. The judge is considered a distinctly superior being with an olympian
detachment enabling him to shake the bonds of preconception and environ-
ment that shackle the judgments of ordinary men. He is capable of impartial
justice even though convinced of the guilt of the accused, or even though
required to judge between his warm friend and his bitter enemy.3 .To enable
a mere litigant to disqualify for prejudice a judge sworn to administer with
impartiality the august corpus bf the law would discredit this conception of
24. He would have no status as a receiver in the jurisdiction where the property was
located; the powers of the equity receiver are confined to the territorial limits of the court
which vests him with authority. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854) ; see 2 Thi-
Dy's SmrrH oN RCEIvERs (2d ed. 1920) §§ 712, 713; Laughlin, Extraterritorial Poicers
of Receivers (1932) 45 HAxv. L. REv. 429.
*Austin v. Lambert, 77 P. (2d) 849 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1938).
1. CAL. Coow Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1937) § 170.5 (as added by STAT. 1937, p. 1496).
The benefits of the statute were not afforded to the district attorney in a criminal case.
Challenges had to be filed before any ruling in the course of trial, the taking of any
evidence, or the impanelment of a jury.
2. Austin v. Lambert, 77 P. (2d) 849 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1938). In an earlier case
before the District Court of Appeal, the exclusion of the district attorney was held an
additional ground of unconstitutionality. Daigh v. Schaffer, 73 P. (2d) 927 (1937). This
reason was expressly repudiated by the Supreme Court in the later case, cited above,
and will not be discussed in this note.
'3. State v. Cole, 136 Kan. 381, 15 P. (2d) 452 (1932); Bond v. Bond, 127 Me.
117, 141 Atl. 833 (1928). See In re Cameron, 126 Tenn. 614, 649, 151 S.W. 64, 74
(1912) ; Leonard v. Willcox, 101 Vt. 195, 215, 142 At. 762, 771 (1928).
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the judiciary.4 It is said, also, that easy disqualification would be abused by
the unscrupulous, thereby disrupting the administration of justice, humiliating
a worthy judge for no sufficient reason, and bringing the judicial system
generally into disrepute.0 And in any event a judge's decision does not end
a case, for a dissatisfied litigant has an adequate remedy by appeal.0 On the
whole, therefore, these jurisdictions permit disqualification only for those
reasons available under common law as interpreted in the United States, i.e.,
pecuniary interest and relationship to the parties.7 Some states have also
recognized bias and prejudice but have required sufficient proof to establish
these charges,8 for "the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor
in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose
authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea."
The attitude of those states which have simplified the process of disquali-
fication reflects a similar concern for the preservation of public confidence
in the judiciary. Based upon a different premise, however, this philosophy
depends upon different methods to attain its purpose. Despite the exalted
character of his office, the judge is treated as a normal person subject to
ordinary human limitations, and therefore possibly unfitted to act impartially
in a particular case.10 Although a litigant's reasons may be vagu6 and un-
provable, he may nevertheless feel that prejudice exists. Hence it is thought
preferable to disqualify a judge when merely challenged, even though spe-
cific investigation might find him possessed of all the judicial virtues."1
Possible abuse of this procedure has been regarded by the courts as no more
4. Arbitrary power to disqualify may not be vested in the litigant, Ex pare
N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 978 (M. D. Ala. 1912); Daigh v. Schaffer, 73 P. (2d)
927 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1937). See Comment (1926) 5 ORE. L. REv. 316, 320.
5. See Kolowich v. Circuit Judge, 264 Mich. 668, 670, 250 N. V. 875 (1933);
Pruitt v. State, 70 P. (2d) 129, 131 (Okla. Cr. Ct. App. 1937) ; In re Crawford's Estate,
307 Pa. 102, 108, 160 Atl. 585, 587 (1931) ; In re Cameron, 126 Tenn. 614, 650, 151 S. W.
64, 74 (1912); Comments (1926) 5 ORE. L. REv. 316, 320; (1932) 11 ORE. L, REV.
410, 411; (1932) 20 CALIF. L. REv. 312, 318.
6. See Comment (1926) 5 ORE. L. Rav. 316, 320.
.7. See Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 978, 986 (M. D. Ala. 1912) ; Ex parte
Thompson, 23 Ala. App. 46, 50, 121 So. 429, 431 (1929); Bond v. Bond, 127 Me. 117,
122, 141 Ati. 833, 835 (1928). Typical statutes restricted to common law grounds:
N. Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 15; TEX. ANN. CODE CRIII. PRoC. (Vernon, 1926) Art. 552.
8. The challenged judge decides upon his own disqualification, subject to appeal.
De Ran v. Stahl, 49 Ohio App. 262, 197 N. E. 144 (1934); Crowley-Milner & Co.
v. Reid, 239 Mich. 605, 215 N. W. 29 (1927). See State v. Cole, 136 Kan. 381, 382,
15 P. (2d) 452, 453 (1932); In re Crawford's Estate, 307 Pa. 102, 108, 160 Atl. 585,
587 (1931).
9. 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES * 361.
10. See State ex rel. Hannah v. Armigo, 38 N. M. 73, 77, 28 P.(2d) 511, 513 (1933);
People ex rel. Burke v. District Court, 60 Colo. 1, 18, 152 Pac. 149, 155 (1915).
11. Here, it is stated, the presumption favors the litigant. Public confidence in the
judiciary as a whole is more important than the rights of the judge in any particular
case. See Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 583, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932); Williams v.
Howard, 270 Ky. 728, 730, 110 S. W. (2d) 661, 663 (1937) ; U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore.
77, 82, 245 Pac. 1074, 1075 (1926).
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than a single disadvantage which the legislature could properly consider less
important than countervailing benefits, and certainly no basis for a declara-
tion of unconstitutionality. 12 The remedy by appeal has been declared inade-
quate since a judge, unconsciously or d.lberately, can make his bias effective
without committing such reversible error as will appear in the record on
appeal. 13 States subscribing to this philosophy provide for disqualification
upon the filing by either party of an affidavit of prejudice. Some require
that facts be alleged sufficient to constitute bias and prejudice but deny any
inquiry into the truth of the allegations. 14 Others require the judge to certify
his own disqualification upon a simple statement that the affiant believes the
judge prejudiced against him.15
The present trend is distinctly in favor of easier disqualification. Even in
those states which recognize only common law grounds, courts have stretched
the statutes to afford a change of judge where it formerly might have been
denied. 16 An affidavit which must contain facts sufficient to indicate bias
and prejudice has been held to satisfy this requirement if the allegations
make it appear in any way doubtful that the petitioner will get a fair trial. 7
And constitutional objections to the simple affidavit because it dispenses with
12. Berger v. U. S., 255 U. S. 22 (1921); Powers v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L
Rep. 1007, 70 S. XV. 644 (1903); Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 30 Mont.
529, 77 Pac. 312 (1904) ; State ex rel. Beach v. District Court, 53 Nev. 444, 5 P. (2d)
535 (1931).
13. Berger v. U. S., 255 U. S. 22 (1921); Howell v. Florida, 77 Fla. 119, 81 So.
287 (1919) ; Massie v. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 588, 20 S. NV. 704 (1892).
14. An appeal may be taken from the ruling of the challenged judge upon the
sufficiency of the affidavit. Berger v. U. S., 255 U. S. 22 (1921) ; People ex rcl. Burke
v. District Court, 60 Colo. 1, 152 Pac. 149 (1915) ; Rourke v. Bevis, 171 Old. 392, 42 P.
(2d) 898 (1935).
15. Stephens v. Stephens, 17 Ariz. 305, 152 Pac. 164 (1915); State ex rel. Beach
v. District, 53 Nev. 444, 5 P. (2d) 535 (1931); U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245
Pac. 1074 (1926). Under some statutes the challenged judge has the altermtive of
changing the venue instead of calling another judge. State ex rel. Sell v. District Court,
52 Mont. 457, 158 Pac. 1018 (1916); State v. Bohner, 210 WVisc. 651, 246 N. ,V. 314
(1933). Change of venue for prejudice of the judge involves the same principles as
disqualification for prejudice. Perrin v. State, 81 Wisc. 135, 50 N. NV. 516 (1891).
Filing of the affidavit with the governor, followed by his assignment of another judge,
has been held unconstitutional. State ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 273 N. W. 634 (Minn.
Sup. Ct 1937). See Comments (1938) 36 Mica. L. REv. 985; (1938) 22 I.mnri. L.
REv. 729.
16. People ex rel. Union Bag and Paper Corp. v. Gilbert, 143 Misc. 237, 2S6 N. Y.
Supp. 442 (Sup. Ct 1932), aff'd, 236 App. Div. 873, 260 N. Y. Supp. 939 (3d Dep't
1932) (judge disqualified for remote relationship to the mayor, a party to the suit in a
merely representative capacity). See In re Cameron, 126 Tenn. 614, 660, 151 S.V. 64,
77 (1912) ; Ex parte Pease, 123 Tex. Cr. 43, 47, 57 S. V. (2d) 575, 576 (1933).
17. Jenson v. Jenson, 96 Colo. 151, 40 P. (2d) 238 (1935); State ex rel. Mickle
v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 131 So. 331 (1930) (deposit of $5, unknovn to judge before
notified by liquidator, enough to disqualify); State cx reL. Vilcox v. Bird, 179 OL.
594, 67 P. (2d) 966 (1937); State ex reL. Conley v. Parks, 32 Old. Cr. 61, 239 Pac.
941 (1925).
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proof have met with little success.18 It is said that the challenged judge is
in no position to determine whether he himself is biased,19 and that in any
event so tenuous a concept as state of mind is incapable of precise proof.,'
Also, because of judicial reluctance to determine the rights of litigants when
either party doubts that justice will be done, judges have expressed a desire
to be relieved immediately of so delicate a situation.2 1 Consequently, once
the challenge has been made by affidavit, nothing is said to remain for
judicial determination.
The California provision for peremptory challenge carries this general trend
but a logical step beyond the process of disqualification by simple affidavit.
Functionally viewed, there is little basis for differentiating between an affi-
davit without proof and a peremptory challenge. In either one, the operative
factor is the demand for removal, not the actual disqualifying circumstances.
2 22
Nor is the simple affidavit any more assurance against abuse of the privilege
than the peremptory challenge. Since general allegations of bias and preju-
dice are sufficient to secure disqualification by affidavit, the threat of perjury
is no restraint and an unscrupulous litigant may abuse his power as readily
18. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529, 7.7 Pac. 312 (1904);
U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926); State ex rel. Beach v. District,
53 Nev. 444, 5 P. (2d) 535 (1931); State ex tel Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N! M. 73,
28 P. (2d) 511 (1933). See State ex rel. Thompson v. Day, 273 N. W. 684, 686
(Minn. Sup. Ct. 1937). Cf. Moore et ux. v. Love, 107 S.W. (2d) 982 (Tenn. Sup. Ct.
1937). But see State ex rel. Chute v. Marshall, 105 Ohio St. 320, 323, 137 N. E. 870,
871 (1922). Contra: Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 978 (M. D. Ala. 1912).
19. See Berger v. U. S., 255 U. S. 22, 36 (1921) ; Briggs v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. 336, 344, 10 P. (2d) 1003, 1006 (1932) ; U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 85, 245 Pac.
1074, 1076 (1926).
20. See People ex rel. Burke v. District Court, 60 Colo. 1, 18, 152 Pac. 149, 155
(1915) ; State ex rel. Conley v. Parks, 32 Ok1. Cr. 61, 65, 239 Pac. 941, 942 (1925) ;
State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 77, 28 P. (2d) 511, 513 (1933). No
further proof beyond the charge of prejudice is possible or necessary. State ex rel.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529, 77 Pac. 312 (1904); Lincoln v.
Oklahoma, 8 Okl. 546, 58 Pac. 730 (1899). Cf. Austin v. Lambert, 77 P. (2d) 849
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1938) (regrettable that grounds of disqualification not susceptible to
proof should seem sufficiently grave to justify this legislation).
21. See Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 1 F. (2d) 582, 584 (V. D. Tenn. 1934);
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 18 P. (2d) 759, 762 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933); Palatka
v. Frederick, 128 Fla. 366, 370, 174 So. 826, 827 (1937). Contra: Benedict v.
Seiberling, 17 F. (2d) 831 (N. D. Ohio 1926) ; United States v. Buck, 18 F. Supp. 827
(W. D. Mo. 1937).
22. Conkling v. Crosby, 29 Ariz. 60, 239 Pac. 506 (1925) ; Washoe Copper Co. v.
Hickey, 46 Mont. 363, 128 Pac. 584 (1912) ; State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N. M.
73, 28 P. (2d) 511 (1933) ; U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926). But see
Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 978, 998 (M. D. Ala. 1912). The affidavit has
become an unimportant technicality in the process of disqualification. State cx rtel.
McGarr v. Debaun, 198 Ind. 661, 154 N. E. 492 (1926) ; State ex rel. Stokes v. District
Court, 55 Nev. 115, 27 P. (2d) 534 (1933). See Sam v. State, 33 Ariz. 383, 403, 265
Pac. 609, 616 (1928).
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under one as under the other.2 The only effective restraint is to limit the
time of filing and the number of challenges. 24 Not only were these safeguards
included in the California statute, but in addition the legislature imposed more
stringent limitations than are included in several similar statutes in other
states. While other statutes have enabled the parties to agree upon the
judge to be appointed or the venue to which the action is to be transferredn
and have not limited the number of disqualifications, 0 under the California
statute each litigant is limited to a single change of judge and has no in-
fluence over the appointment of the substitute assigned by the presiding
county judge.27 The California legislature would therefore appear to have
been amply justified in deciding that the simple affidavit was mere ritual
which might well be removed, leaving unadorned the peremptory challenge
that simple affidavits have in fact become.
Since the statute seems to be a logical development from earlier California
enactments and decisions,2 it is surprising that the courts should have inter-
rupted the general trend toward easier disqualification. Perhaps the system
of peremptory challenge was too abrupt a modification of existing practice,
since the intermediate stage of disqualification by simple affidavit had never
been tried in that state 2 9 This judicial rebuff, however, need not lead to
23. Facts must be set forth with the precision of a bill of particulars before an
affiant need fear a prosecution for perjury. Morse v. Lewis, 54 F. (2d) 1027 (C. C. A.
4th, 1932) ; American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 6 F. Supp. 215
(S. D. N. Y. 1933) ; Neace v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 149, 47 S. IV. (2d) 995 (1932).
A fortiori a simple affidavit expressing mere belief in prejudice of judge would be inade-
quate. See Bachmann v. Milwaukee, 47 Visc. 435, 436, 2 N. IV. 543, 544 (1879).
24. See Howell v. Florida, 77 Fla. 119, 129, 81 So. 287, 289 (1919) (abuse may be
checked by limiting the privilege to a single disqualification for prejudice).
25. State ex reL. Spencer v. Baker, 7 N. E. (2d) 984 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1937) ; State
ex reL. Sell v. District Court, 52 Mont. 457, 158 Pac. 1018 (1916) ; Moruzzi v. Fed. Life
and Casualty Co., 42 N. M. 35, 75 P. (2d) 320 (1938).
26. State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Clancy, 30 Mont. 529, 77 Pac. 312
(1904) (five challenges available for each party). For a general summary, see Roberts
Mining and Milling Co. v. District Court, 56 Nev. 299, 50 P. (2d) 512 (1935).
27. CA. CODE Cv. Paoc. (Deering, 1937) § 170.5.
28. McCauley v. Weller, 12 Cal. 500, (1859) (prejudice unseemly, but not yet
statutory ground for disqualification); see People ex re. Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 548,
560 (1861) (statute making change of venue mandatory upon application of defendant
would be constitutional); People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 56 Pac. 44 (1899) (court
desired to consider affidavit of prejudice final); see, generally, Comment (1932) 20
CAiUL. L. Rrv. 312 (disqualification now determined by another judge on basis of affi-
davits and counter affidavits filed). In special cases, the change is mandatory. Sacra-
mento Drainage District v. Rector, 172 Cal. 385, 156 Pac. 506 (1916); Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 18 P. (2d) 759 (Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1933).
29. In courts of justices of the peace, the simple affidavit is effective. See People
v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 413, 56 Pac. 44, 48 (1899). The court stated as a minor
ground of unconstitutionality that since the present statute applies only to municipal
and superior courts, excluding justice's courts, it violates the constitutional provision
that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. Austin v. Lambert,
77 P. (2d) 849 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1938). Perhaps the legislature thought the peremptory
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abandonment of all attempts to make the process easier. The well-established
simple affidavit, which serves the same purposes though less neatly, still
remains for adoption in any state where it is not already in operation. If
the issue should arise in states accustomed to disqualify their judges by
simple affidavit, the courts might well approve a shift to peremptory chal-
lenge as a comparatively minor simplification of the process.
EXEMPTION OF INCOME FROM PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH EXEMPT
INSURANCE PROCEEDS*
NAMING herself as beneficiary, a widow set up a trust fund with part of
$120,000 received from her husband's life and accident insurance policies.'
The trustee bank purchased for the trust certain income-producing securities.
A loan association, in an endeavor to collect $2,500 on a deficiency judgment
against the widow, served garnishment process on the bank. Under a statute
exempting the "proceeds or avails" of such insurance policies, 2 the income
from the securities in the bank's possession, as well as the securities them-
selves, was held not subject to attachment.
3
With the passing of the social philosophy that condoned the debtors' prison,
the desirability of protecting the debtor from utter destitution has long been
unquestioned.4 More recently, a miscellaneous panorama of statutes exempt-
ing to a greater or less degree the proceeds of life insurance policies from
creditor's claims has become familiar,5 with the result that the debtor has
been assured of something more than a minimum protection, still without
serious articulate objection. But such a statute rarely declares just how far
the exemption is to extend. Perhaps it protects the proceeds in the hands
of the beneficiaries. If this is true, it may apply to property purchased with
the exempt proceeds. And if carried so far, it may even extend to the income
from property so purchased. Since the underlying policy of the exemption
challenge too like the simple affidavit to warrant a change of practice in justice's courts.
In any event, the two are so similar as to preclude any serious charge of discrimination.
Cf. Diehl v. Crump, 72 Okl. 108, 179 Pac. 4 (1919) (simple affidavit limited in its appli-
cation to a single county).
*Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kneisley (Pacific Nat. Bank of Seattle, Gar-
nishees), 76 P. (2d) 297 (Wash. 1938).
1. $42,500 was turned over in trust; with the remainder annuity certificates were
purchased, guaranteeing the beneficiary the sum of $239 per month for the remainder
of her life. Upon appeal, there was no doubt that this annuity was exempt.
2. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 569, 7230-1. The exemption
affects only those debts existing at the time the policy is made available for use.
3. Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kneisley (Pacific Nat. Bank of Seattle, Gar-
nishees), 76 P. (2d) 297 (Wash. 1938).
4. See Folz, Exemption Laus and Public Policy (1905) 53 Ali. L. REG. 721.
5. A complete compilation of the statutes appears in C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 7108
et seq. (1936).
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statutes indicates no certain answers to the questions thus raised, the courts
have perforce sought determinants in the ever elusive "intention of the legis-
lature." So seeking, in the instant case, a court for the first time took all
three progressive steps, with the startling result that a widow was guaranteed
the free enjoyment of an income presumably sufficient, in any one year alone,
for the full satisfaction of her judgment debt.
For the courts facing the problem, the first hurdle is low: there is no
doubt that a statute of the type here involved protects the insurance money
after it has been paid to the beneficiary. Question arises at this first stage
only in those states where the statute purports to exempt money "to be
paid."6 Difficulties here are comparable to those encountered in construing
the federal statute of 1873 exempting the proceeds of a government pension
It is generally clear that the protection afforded involves something more
than an assurance that the payment will not be cut off at the source-attached
in the hands of the insurance company. But even under the most Liberal
legislation, if the proceeds become mingled with other funds so that they
cannot be identified, the right of exemption may well be lost.8
6. There is a sharp conflict as to whether the words "to be paid" are in effect
descriptive of the proceeds which are the subject of the exemption, or descriptive of
the duration or period of the exemption. Those courts which have taken the former
view benefit the beneficiary by holding that the exemption continues after the payment
of the proceeds by the insurer. First Nat. Bank v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. W.
994 (1896) ; State v. Collins, 70 Okla. 323, 174 Pac. 568 (1918) ; Bank of Cushing v.
Funnell, 144 Okla. 188, 290 Pac. 177 (1930) (money exempt when deposited); cf.
Merrell Drug Co. v. Dixon, 131 Ky. 212, 115 S. NV. 179 (1909). Other authority,
taling the latter view upon the tenuous reasoning that these statutes were enacted for
the benefit of the insurers, holds the proceeds to be no longer exempt from process after
having been paid over by the company. Martin v. Martin, 187 II1. 200, 58 N. E. 230
(1900) ; Hathorn v. Robinson, 96 Me. 33, 51 At. 236 (1901) ; Recor v. Bank, 142 Mich.
479, 106 N. W. 182 (1905); Bull v. Case, 165 N. Y. 578, 59 N. E. 301 (1901); cf.
Bank of Brimson v. Graham, 335 Mo. 1196, 76 S. V. (2d) 376 (1934) ; see (1924)
8 MiNN. L. REv. 549.
7. 17 STAT. 576 (1873), 38 U. S. C. §54 (1934), providing that pension money
due or to become due should be exempt from attachment, levy, or seizure. This statute
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and a number of state
courts so that pension money in the hands of the pensioner is not exempt. Rozelle
v. Rhodes, 116 Pa. 129, 9 At. 160 (1887). Consequently property purchased with such
money is not exempt. McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U.S. 122 (190); Coaldey v. Under-
wood, 13 Ky. L. 654, 18 S.W. 7 (1892); Cranz v. White, 27 KaM 319 (1882); Friend
v. Garcelon, 77 Me. 25 (1885); In re Ferguson's Estate, 140 Wis. 583, 123 N.W. 123
(1909). In fewer jurisdictions it has been held that the money is exempt from attach-
ment in the hands of the pensioner, and further, that this exemption extends to property
purchased with the money so received. Crow v. Brown, 81 Iowa 344, 46 N.V. 993
(1890); Reiff v. Mack, 160 Pa. 265, 28 At. 699 (1894); cf. N. Y. Ctv. PrAc. Ace
§ 667 and cases cited note 18, infra.
8. Baxter v. Old Nat City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N. E. 514 (1933) (fund
not exempt when composed of exempt and non-exempt insurance proceeds). In an early
New York case, property was held not exempt because it was unascertainable whether
it was purchased with the proceeds of the pension or with profits from its investment
1410 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
Although the majority of the insurance exemption statutes thus bridge the
initial difficulty, at least two courts have literally construed the statutes so
as to defeat attempts to extend the exemption to non-exempt property pur-
chased with exempt proceeds. 9 In effect, the debtor in these jurisdictions is
restricted to the purchase of services or special types of property also exempt
by statute, such as household goods, or tools of a trade, or a homestead. 10
The court in the instant case adopted the apparently unique position taken
by the Supreme Court of Iowa construing a similar statute.11 That court,
in 1903, declared the exemption to extend to any property purchased with
-exempt proceeds. 12 Even the Iowa decision, however, gives no indication of
the result to be expected when the insurance proceeds make up only a part
of the purchase price, or when property bought solely with exempt proceeds
increases in value.' 3 Perhaps the logical conclusion is to extend the exemp-
in other property. Wygant v. Smith, 2 Lans. 185 (N. Y. 1869). See also Yates Nat.
Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 556, 23 N. E. 1108, 1109 (1890) ; Benedict v. Higgins,
165 App. Div. 611, 615, 151 N. Y. Supp. 42, 44 (3d Dep't 1915) ; cf. In re Elliothorpe,
111 Fed. 163 (W. D. N. Y. 1901).
9. Pefly v. Reynolds, 115 Kan. 105, 222 Pac. 121 (1924) (the statute also provided
for exemption from taxation); Ross v. Simser, 193 Minn. 407, 258 N. W. 582 (1935);
cf. Merrell Drug Co. v. Dixon, 131 Ky. 212, 115 S.W. 179 (1909); Bank of Brumson
v. Graham, 335 Mo. 1196, 76 S.W. (2d) 376 (1934).
10. All states and the District of Columbia have statutes exempting specific items
of property from attachment or sale under a judgment. See C. C. H. Bankr. Serv.
7101 et seq. (1936).
The problem as to the extent to which an exemption will be granted arises also in
relation to those statutes exempting special types of property. The situation here is,
however, easily distinguished. It is reasoned that homesteads, tools of a trade, etc.,
are exempt for the express purpose of assuring a debtor a home or the means for
living, and this is satisfied by confining the exemption to the specified property. Conse-
quently, if the debtor voluntarily sells his exempt chattels or real estate, he evidences
that he no longer requires the protection and the proceds are subject to the claims of
his creditors. Union County Investment Co. v. Messix, 152 Iowa 412, 132 N. W 823
(1911) ; Maxey v. Tinsley, 167 Tenn. 128, 67 S.W. (2d) 139 (1934) ; Mann v. Kelsey,
71 Tex. 609, 12 S.W. 43 (1888); Roundy v. Converse, 71 Wis. 524, 37 N.W. 811
(1888). This rule is qualified in some jurisdictions, so that the proceeds are exempt
if the debtor intends to reinvest in exempt property within a reasonable time. Van Hook
v. Robinson, 31 Ky. L. 1347, 105 S.W. 129 (1907); Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20,
69 N. W. 78 (1896) ; Blackford v. Boak, 73 Ore. 61, 143 Pac. 1136 (1914) ; cf. MeLeod
v. McLeod, 89 S.W. 199 (Ky. 1905) ; see Comment (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REv. 414.
11. IOWA CODE (1935) § 8776, exempting "avails" of life and accident insurance
policies up to $15,000.
12. Cook v. Allee, 119 Iowa 226, 93 N. W. 93 (1903). The force of this case as
a holding is lessened by the fact that the property exempted was a house and lot, which
might have been eligible for exemption as a homestead. But cf. Friedlander v. Mahoney,
31 Iowa 311 (1871) (property not exempt when acquired by assignment of a life insur-
ance policy before death of the insured).
13. The Iowa court, however, held that a horse obtained in exchange for another
purchased with pension money is also exempt to its full value when no additional means
are invested, though such value is in excess of the amount originally invested in the
first horse. Smith v. Hill, 83 Iowa 684, 49 N. W. 1043 (1891) ; cf. Dargan v. Williams,
66 Neb. 1, 91 N. W. 862 (1902).
19381 NOTES 1411
tion in all cases only to so much of the property as does not exceed the exempt
money in value.' 4 No sound criticism can be made of such a result. Although,
strictly speaking, the terms "proceeds or avails" may apply only to the amount
collected from the insurance companies, it seems reasonable that legislators
would not have intended to limit the exemption to the money itself. For,
as has been aptly. said, so to limit it would destroy the value of the money
as a purchasing medium' 5 and thus frustrate the legislature's purpose in
exempting money to provide for the debtor's needs.'0 Thus, Iowa, in order
to avoid the enervating interpretation usually given the federal pension stat-
ute,17 enacted a statute specifically exempting pension money whether in the
actual possession of the pensioner, or deposited, loaned, or invested by him.' 8
The next step, the Supreme Court of Iowa refused to take, and visely
drew a definite distinction between money invested and its income. Protec-
tion was denied to interest accruing on bonds purchased with exempt money.1"
The indication is clear that this court would have placed a similar restriction
on the statute exempting the "avails" of life insurance policies.20 The court
in the instant case, on the other hand, appeared to find it difficult, despite a
vigorous dissent, to exempt the proceeds without also exempting the income. 2'
Accordingly, the money was allowed to be put to a productive use and its
product protected. Such use is not itself necessarily improper: the money
might well be used to buy "tools of a trade." But it can scarcely be contended
that the product of these tools should share the exemption.
Because of the humanitarian ideal underlying exemption legislation, it is
generally accepted that the statutes, although in derogation of the common
14. Cf. Yates County Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 23 N. E. 1103 (1890);
Countryman v. Countryman, 28 N.Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1893). But cf. cases cited
note 13, supra.
15. See Cook v. Allee, 119 Iowa 226, 229, 93 N. ,V. 93 (1903) ; Yates County Nat.
Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 555, 23 N. E. 1108, 1109 (1890).
16. It must be admitted that this argument loses some of its force in the light of
the ever-present possibility that the debtor may buy property itself exempt. See note 10,
mipra.
17. See note 7, supra.
18. IovA CODE (1935) § 11761. Similar statutes have been enacted in California
[CAL CODE CIV. PROc. (Deering, 1931) § 690(20)], and NebraskL-a. Nsa. Co mp. STAT.
(1929) c. 20, § 1560; Dargan v. Williams, 66 Neb. 1, 91 N. IV. 862 (1902). Other
statutes exempt the money only after it has been received by the pensioner. CouNr. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 5791; Price v. Society for Savings, 64 Conn. 362, 30 At. 139 (1894)
(exemption extends to pension money deposited in the bank); N. Y. Civ. PhAc. Acr
§ 667, Yates County Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, 119 N. Y. 550, 23 N. E. 1103 (1890);
Countryman v. Countryman, 28 N. Y. Supp. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; Benedict v. Higgins,
165 App. Div. 611, 151 N. Y. Supp. 42 (3d Dep't 1915).
19. Appanoose County v. Henke, 207 Iowa 835, 223 N. IV. 876 (1929) ; cf. Haefer
v. Mullison, 90 Iowa 372, 57 N. ,V. 893 (1894) (crops grown upon land purchased with
pension are not exempt). But cf. Smith v. Hill, 83 Iovra 684, 49 N. IV. 1043 (1891)
supra, note 13.
20. See note 11, supra.
21. The court agreed to the exemption of the securities, but divided on the extension
of the exemption to the income.
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law, are to be liberally construed.22 Their purpose is not to restrict the rights
of creditors any further than necessary to save the debtor and his family
from complete misfortune.2 3 No principle of public policy can justify unlimited
exemptions, and a result as extreme as that reached in the principal case
should follow only the explicit and unqualified fiat of the legislature. The
"what-are-we-coming-to ?" argument, however much maligned, 24 is eminently
applicable. If income is to be exempt as "proceeds," it follows that additional
property bought with that income is of the same nature, and the income from
that property, etc., etc., etc. 25 As a logical consequence of the decision in the
instant case, exempt insurance proceeds might be used in the formation of an
endless chain of exemptions conceivably leading to enormous accumulations
of property, all free from the claims of creditors. 26
MUNICIPAL SUBSIDIES AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE SOUTH *
MUNICIPAL subsidies to attract establishment of private industry have in
the past run afoul of a double-edged prohibition. They have been compelled
to meet the challenge of the "fundamental principle" that taxes may be levied
and collected only for a public purpose.' And they have often foundered in
the face of state constitutional provisions forbidding municipal appropriations
22. Patten Package Co. v. Houser, 102 Fla. 603, 136 So. 353 (1931); Dawson v.
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S. V. 567 (1927) ; Arbogast v. Linz, 180 Wash.
315, 39 P. (2d) 615 (1935); see (1927) 13 IowA L. REv. 104, 105. Contra: Knabb v.
Drake, 23 Pa. 489 (1854).
23. See Folz, supra note 4; cases cited note 22, smpra.
24. See ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1935) 253 ct scq.; ARNOLD, SYMroLS
oF GOVERNMENT (1935) 211 et seq.
25. It is interesting to speculate as to the effect on the decision in the principal case
had this point been strenuously pressed. The court in its opinion seems unaware of its
full import. Even more surprisingly, appellant's brief makes little more than a passing
reference to the fact that the securities held by the bank at the time that it was garnished
included not only securities purchased with the original $42,500, but also securities pur-
chased with the proceeds obtained from the sale of securities purchased with the original
sum, or the income from them. Brief for Appellants 8, Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n
v. Kneisley (Pacific Nat. Bank of Seattle, Garnishees), 76 P. (2d) 297 (Wash. 1938);
cf. Wygant v. Smith, 2 Lans. 185 (N. Y. 1896).
26. See note 2, supra.
*Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799 (Miss. 1938).
1. The legislature has no constitutional right "to create a public debt, or to lay
a tax, or to authorize any municipal corporation to do it, in order to raise funds for a
mere private purpose." Black, C. J., in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa.
147, 168 (1853). The public purpose doctrine was first justified as being implicit in
our system of government. Not until nearly seventy years later [Jones v. Portland,
245 U. S. 217 (1917)] was it definitely grounded in due process. The doctrine was
full blown before the depths of the Fourteenth Amendment had been fathomed.
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or loans of credit to private corporations. 2 The "public purpose" doctrine,
which originally validated municipal bond issues for railroad promotion on
the ground that they were aiding public corporations, 3 just as regularly in-
validated those which were intended to serve as bounties for purely private
industry.4 Economic necessity soon precluded so limited a construction.
With urbanization and its attendant problems of supplying water, light, heat,
and transportation for large masses of people came a broadening of the doc-
trine to embrace these natural monopolies.5 Municipal experimentation and
participation in any industry which supplied a "necessity of life" was later
permitted, and the United States Supreme Court indicated that state legis-
latures and courts were best qualified to isolate the content of that elusive
phrase.8 Express constitutional prohibitions against appropriations and loans
of credit have been similarly relaxed.7 They have upon occasion been cir-
cumvented by construing them to apply only to the railroad porkbarrels
which instigated their enactment.8 And where such appropriations have been
found to be in the "public interest" with only incidental benefit to individ-
uals, the constitutional safeguards have lost their force.0 A recent case is
indicative that economic pressure may compel further extension of the public
purpose doctrine and additional ingenuity in constitutional interpretation.
2. Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U. S. 1 (1885); Carotherq v. Town of Booneville, 169
Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934). Most state constitutions contain express restrictions of
this nature. They are collected in GRAY, LilrAuwns ON TE TAxilIG Poni (195)
140-157.
3. Railroads were considered public highways because they were subject to state
regulation and enjoyed the power of eminent domain. See Towm of Queensbury v.
Culver, 19 Wall. 83, 91 (U. S. 1873); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147,
170 (1853). Contra: People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870). See McAllister, Public
Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CUIr. L. Rv. 137, 140 et seq.
4. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 ValL 655 (U. S. 1874) (aid to bridge co.) ; Ottowa
v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110 (1883) (aid to private manufacturer); Allen v. Inhabitants
of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1872) (loan for sawmill), follouing Opinion of the Justices, 58
Me. 590 (1871) (aid to manufacturing); Markley v. Village of Mineral City, 58 Ohio
St. 430, 51 N. F. 28 (1898) (land for factories). But cf. Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U. S.
310 (1876) (aid to grist mill upheld); distinguished in Osborne v. Adams, 106 U. S.
181 (1882) (similar aid denied).
5. Hamilton Gaslight and Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 U. S. 258 (1892) (fuel
supply); Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592, 24 N. E. 1084 (1890) (municipal
lighting) ; Sun Printing Ass'n v. Mayor of New York, 152 N. Y. 257, 46 N.E. 499 (1897)
(transit system); Comstock v. Syracuse, 5 N. Y. Supp. 874 (Sup. Ct. 1889) (rater
supply).
6.. Jones v. Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233
(1920) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. NV. 172 (1926), aff'd, 275
U. S. 504 (1927). See Comments (1918) 27 Ymm.u L. J. 824, (1932) 32 Cos. L REV.
881, (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 775.
7. Merchants Union Barb Wire Co. v. Brown, 64 Iowa 275, 20 N. IV. 434 (1884);
Highway Comm. v. Vaughn, 288 S. NV. 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
8. Cobb v. Parnell, 183 Ark. 429,36 S. IV. (2d) 388 (1931).
9. Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350, 287 Pan. 455 (1930). Nor do such provisions
apply to state owned enterprise. Sun Printing Ass'n v. Mayor of New York, 152 N.Y.
257, 46 N. F. 499 (1897).
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A Mississippi statute formulates an Industrial Plan, the declared purpose
of which is the relief of unemployment and the balancing of agriculture and
industry.' 0 It provides that any municipality may, with the consent of a
supervisory Industrial Commission, issue bonds to enable it to acquire, erect,
and equip any industrial enterprise. The plant may be operated by the city
itself or may be sold, leased, or "otherwise disposed of on terms best pro-
moting the public interest." Pursuant to these provisions, the City of Winona
issued bonds to finance the erection of a municipal hosiery, knitting, and
wearing apparel factory, to be operated by a former northern firm. In a
validation proceeding brought by the city, a decree upholding the constitu-
tionality of the bond issue was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi."' The majority opinion stated that the intent to balance industry and
agriculture and relieve unemployment was a public purpose. It admitted that
an outright lease to the prospective company could not have withstood con-
stitutional attack. But it argued that since under the terms of the statute
the city was to retain a measure of supervision over the terms and conditions
under which the lessee company would be permitted to operate, such control
constituted the company the agent of the municipality in enforcing the de-
clared purpose of the legislation. 12 And if the purpose be public, it is said
not to matter if it be achieved through a private channel. The provision in
the Mississippi constitution outlawing appropriations to private corporationsa
was summarily dismissed on the familiar ground that since the purpose had
already been determined to be public, the provision was no longer applicable.
A reluctant concurring opinion expressed doubt as to whether the domain
of manufacturing could be entered purely because other enterprise would be
benefited thereby, and hesitated to take the irrevocable step of validating the
bonds without further assurance that the city would actually retain a measure
of control over the factory.14 A single dissenter stood aghast at the effort
to make Mississippi "safe not for democracy but for communism."' 0;
The United States Supreme Court, in a memorandum opinion, dismissed
an appeal from this decision.1 There was no comment upon its implications.
10. Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1.
11. Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799 (Miss. 1938).
12. In Carothers v. Town of Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934), the
court held invalid a statute authorizing the municipality to issue bonds to erect a plant
to be leased to a garment factory. This holding was distinguished on the ground that
there was neither a legislative declaration that the purpose was to relieve unemployment
and promote the general welfare nor any supervisory power retained to insure that the
purpose was carried out.
13. MIss. CONST. § 183.
14. The majority opinion intimated, however, that a provision in the lease providing
for its automatic termination if the conditions imposed by the city and the State Com-
mission were not fulfilled would receive the sanction of the court. Albritton v. City
of Winona, 178 So. 799, 808 (Miss. 1938).
15. Id. at 812. Cf. Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 133 (1872) ("It is
communism incipient, if not perfected"); Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243,
256, 208 N. W. 962, 963 (1926) ("This is socialism and communism, twin enemies of
the republic").
16. Albritton v. City of Winona, 58 Sup. Ct. 766 (1938)..
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The immediate significance of the instant case is not that governments may
operate where they may not regulate,'7 nor even that the Supreme Court has
as yet no disposition to interfere in experimental steps toward state socialism.
The shadows of the power here exercised had already been cast.18 But the
economic implications of the Mississippi Industrial Plan are of considerable
moment. For this statute is the latest weapon in a new "War between the
States,"--a bitter competition for the attraction and establishment of industry.
Southern agricultural states have long felt the pinch of their dependence
upon their more industrialized neighbors. Lack of employment for able
workers, depressed markets for raw products, low farm income, and sub-
sistence standards of living have been their lot.19 They have naturally sought
to secure a more equal balance of industry and agriculture.o At the same
time there has been an appreciable tendency on the part of industry to decen-
tralize into less industrialized areas21 in order to be nearer sources of supply,
17. "'Public use! in such cases would seem to be a term of wider scope than that
which clothes property or business 'with a public interest' [under the police power]
. . .The use for which the tax is laid may be any purpose in which . . . the lczns-
lature thinks the State's engagement . . .will help the general public and is willing to
pay the cost of the plant and incur the expense of operation." Taft, C. J., in Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 537 (1923).
For discussion of the recent dilation of the "public interest" concept, see Hamilton,
Affectation with a Public Interest (1930) 39 YA.u L J. 1039; (1938) 47 Ym.z L. J.
1201; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Erwin, 5 U. S. L Wmrz 1109 (D. Minn.,
April 29, 1938) (three-judge court).
18. In Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920), the constitutionality of the statute
creating North Dakota's Industrial Commission was upheld. The Commission was em-
powered to issue bonds and enter into business enterprise in order to secure to the
state's farmers adequate prices for their agricultural products. Inefficiency and cost of
operation have long since forced it to cease functioning.
19. Reductions in population due to the movement of job seekers to industrial centers,
disproportionate increases in mortgage debts, and declining land values are perennial
problems. Governor White of Mississippi reports 2,500,000 acres of land in that state
alone forfeit for taxes, an average farm income of $180 and a general average of $212,
compared with a national average of $636. The average rural family income in Alabama
is less than $500. The low farm wage, 48% of that prevailing in the rest of the country,
keeps wages lowered in industry, particularly where the training period is short. See
generally Bidgood, Industrial Alabama (1931) 153 ANNALS 148, 154; Evans, Southern
Labor Supply and Working Conditions in Induslry (1931) 153 ANNALS 156; Wickens,
Adjusting Southern Agriculture to Economic Changes (1931) 153 ANNA.S 193, 194;
N. Y. World Telegram, Jan. 5, 1937, p. 17.
20. Coming to the South as an instrument of alleviation and reclamation, industry
has acquired a social sanction. It has been imbued with a philanthropic character. This
attitude plus a traditional localism explains somewhat the current drive. See Mitchell,
Growth of Mmufacturps in the South (1931) 153 ANNALS 21, 24.
21. During the period of financial expansion when the number of plants lost by
American cities equalled only 58% of those gained, decentralization went almost un-
noticed. Sectional migration, too, had a relatively small role, accounting for only 18.7%
of the employees gained in various committees. But 407o of the net gain of all plants
was in the smaller communities. And positive gains in dispersion during the first three
decades of the century were confined to the South Atlantic region. See generally
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to avoid social legislation, and to secure cheaper labor.2 2 Most conspicuous
is the movement of the textile mills to the south,2 3 although similar relocation
has occurred in a number of industries.2 4 Regulatory depression legislation
has accelerated this process. 25 American business is making mass readjust-
ments to these suddenly crystallized trends. As plant locations are appraised
from a new point of view, alert chambers of commerce in unindustrialized
sections make every effort to weight the balance in favor of a migration that
will bring new industries to their communities. The state advertises natural
advantages ;26 local civic associations in their turn offer substantial induce-
ments.
The tariff-stock device for the encouragement of industry nationally-is
supposedly unavailable in this sectional struggle.27 But a counterpart may
be seen in the growing tendency to attempt to revive "boundary conscious-
CREAMER, IS INDUSTRY DECENTRALIZING? (1930) 11; Industrial Development it the
United States and Canada (1926-1927) (Civic Development Committee of National
Electric Light Ass'n and Policy Holders Service Bureau of Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co.).
22. For common labor, the southern wage is from 50% to 60% that of the rest of
the country; for semi-skilled, from 65% to 85%. The migration towards such wage
savings was so accentuated by the depression that North Carolina, Virginia and Alabama
showed increases in wage jobs in the knitting, furniture and cotton goods factories
despite the general reductions in those industries. See generally BURGY, TnE Nsw
ENGLAND CorroN TEXTILE INDUSTRY (1932) 147, 221; BRUNCK AND CREAMER, LOCA-
TIONAL PATTERNS AND FACTORS IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (Unpublished thesis in Burgess
Library, Columbia University, 1935) 33, 45; Mitchell, sipra note 20, at 25.
23. When the cotton textile movement began, New England had 90%1 of the active
spindles in the country. By 1924 the South was dominant, and in 1936 New England
could account for only 25% of the active spindle hours. See Murchison, Southrn Textile
Manufacturing (1931) 153 ANNALS 30; Bus. NVEEK, Feb. 27, 1937, p. 45. The finishing,
repairing, and machinery manufacturing departments of the industry have followed the
spindles. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 28.
24. The shoe industry has migrated westward to be nearer cheap labor and the source
of ,hides. Although the number of shoes turned out of her factories is greater than ever
before, New England now makes only 33% where she once made 50% of American
shoes. See Graham, Southern Industrialism (1931) 153 ANNALS 257, 264; Bus. WEzn,
Feb. 27, 1937, p. 45.
25. See Bus. WEEK, Feb. 27, 1937, p. 48.
26. Appropriations for attracting new industries supply professionally written copy
to a well balanced list of publications, pointing out (1) nearness to the undeveloped
but growing markets of the South, (2) nearness to rav materials, (3) savings in fuel
costs, and (4) abundant less expensive white labor. Recent appropriations include
$100,000 by Louisiana and $250,000 by North Carolina. See Bidgood, Industrial Alabama
(1931) 153 ANNALS 148, 154; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 5, 1936, p.37; id., Feb. 12, 1938, at pp.
20, 23.
27. State taxes levied solely on goods of foreign origin are invalid. U. S. CoNST.
ART. I, § 10. But for a discussion of successful attempts to circumvent this obstacle see
Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Way
(1938) 38 CoL L. REv. 49.
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ness" by fostering "buy at home" campaigns to boost local industry.23 Ex-
emption from taxation is a common form of inducement, -9 but its efficacy
alone in attracting industrial enterprise seems overrated.0 Manufacturers in
labor-conscious industrial states have been most impressed by promised free-
dom from inhibiting legislation, the closed shop, and labor trouble.31 Reloca-
tion has been encouraged by direct subsidy in the nature of free rent, free
light, water, and power, and even cash to lighten the burden of moving.o
At the same time, trade schools, working in close cooperation with the new
industries have attempted to overcome the objection that the lack of skilled
workers offsets the favorable wage differential.m The sum of these induce-
ments has been a noticeable removal of factories away from the established
industrial states. This in turn has called forth competitive concessions on
28. A number of states and sections have inaugurated such campaigns in complete
disregard of the effect on national marketing and the large volume of emplo)ment
depending on distributive functions. See Bus. WVEEKr, May 25, 1932, p. 9; CoLLI&'S,
April 30, 1938, p. 14.
29. States granting such exemptions are confined almost entirely to the New Eng-
land, Upper Atlantic, and Southeastern areas. Exemptions in New England were more
or less forced in an attempt to match similar favors granted in the South. See Stimson,
The Stimulation of Industry Through Tax Exemption (1933) 11 TAx MA;. 169, 170,
203; (1937) TAx PoLicy, Vol. IV, No. 12, p. 22 (list of assessment ratios by cities
showing variation of from 37% to 100%).
"30. Although liberal tax exemptions were granted to industry, the net income of
manufacturing corporations between 1917 and 1927 declined in Alabama 21%, increased
in Georgia 19% and declined in Mississippi 88%. The complaint of high taxes, though
present, was found to be a relatively insignificant motivating force in the withdrawal
of industry from New York City. Industrial Survey of New York (Report to Hon
Frank J. Taylor, Comptroller, by Chas. E. Murphy, Dec. 30, 1936, March 30, 1937,
June 30, 1937) ; Stimson, supra note 29, at 226.
31. "Labor racketeering" was the chief motive for deserting New York City in
1937. Only the large southern cities have labor trouble. There are no minimum wage
laws, and only Louisiana of all the southern states has "yellow-do'd" contracts and anti-
injunction statutes. See generally CREAUR, IS INDUSTY DECMNTRAUZMG? (1935)
55; Industrial Survey, supra note 30, at 9; Comment (1936) 36 CoL. L, Rav. 776, 779;
(1934) 24 Am. LAB. LEa. Ray. 180; 1 Prentice-Hall Fed. Labor Serv. 119225; Bus.
WN=, Feb. 12, 1938, pp. 20, 24.
32. In Dickinson, Tenn., the title to a factory was held by a Dickinson Development
Corporation. Workers paid 6% of their weekly wages to pay off the bonds. The oper-
ating company paid rent of one dollar a year and got free light and power. In Lewis-
burg, Tenn., the new "municipal hall" after one town meeting was turned over to the
General Shoe Corporation. Thirty thousand dollars of the building's expense is to be
paid by employees, in weekly check-offs as they collect their wages. (1937) 123 Ln'.
DIGEST 35; N. Y. World Telegram, Dec. 31, 1936, p. 19.
33. For an account of the removal of a Maryland firm to Virginia, induced by the
assurance that the town would conduct a "trade school" in connection with the employer's
plant, "learners" to be paid by the town, see N. Y. Times, Jan, 3, 1935, p. 37. See also
N. Y. World Telegram, Jan. 7, 1937, p. 9 (one of a series of articles by Thos. L Stokes
running daily from Dec. 30, 1936 to Jan. 19, 1937).
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their part,34 fostered a growing bitterness,3 5 and even occasioned violence to
prevent the removal of machinery.30 The phenomenon of the runaway shop
has not been accepted without protest.
37
Successes of these city and state campaigns have been signal,38 but the
migratory industries have brought new problems to their hosts. Private
subscription does not confer upon the citizens any systematic control of the
new industry, and "industrial carpetbaggers" are by no means unknown.
Townspeople, heavily obligated, have found their subsidized factories depress-
ing wages,3 9 using the Bedeaux speed-up,40 and threatening further migration
should regulation intervene.41 Mississippi's Industrial Plan formulates a
method of combating these potential abuses. Investigation by, and approval
of the State Commission, retention of control over hours, wages, and per-
sonnel by the city, and a lease conditional upon the fulfillment of the com-
pany's obligations are intended to provide adequate safeguards. At the same
time, government funds and organization are placed behind the inducements
to relocating industry. Whether the state will exercise its power of control
in a salutary manner to prevent the planting of an industrial feudalism upon
the debris of an agricultural feudalism can only be conjectured. Nor can it
now be determined what will amount to a disposal of these factories "on
terms best promoting the public interest." Perhaps the municipality would
best be served by eliminating the fly-by-night concerns, manufacturing on
34. "A declining locality is not deserted by labor . . . Before the compelling
forces (bankruptcy and poverty) make their appearance many experiments to forestall
the workings of economic principles are likely to be tried. Tariff protection and favor-
itism in taxation and a direct bonus from the treasury may be sought to bolster up a
declining locality." U. S. DEP'T Comm.RcE, LocAt, oN OF MANUFACTURES IN TILE U. S.
(digested from a study by the Employment Stabilization Research Institute of the
University of Minnesota, 1933).
35. The anomalous role which the State of Connecticut is playing in helping to
finance the relief of the South (ratio of federal relief granted Connecticut to her tax
returns is 53%--for Mississippi 1967%, Alabama 818%, Georgia 305%) while at tile
same time the South is financing the removal of Connecticut industries, has received
editorial comment. New Haven Register, April 20, 1938, p. 18.
36. N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1933, p. 15.
37. See Comment (1936) 36 COL. L. Rv. 776, 780.
38. Southern states in 1936 and 1937 received $186,326,000 ($59,127,000 more than
the rest of the country combined) of the money going into the building of new process
industries. The southern production of kraft paper has jumped from nothing to 35%
of the country's output. Additional instances and figures are given in Mitchell, sufra
note 20, at 21, 28, 29; Bus. WEac, Oct. 241 1936, p. 40; id., Dec. 5, 1936, p. 37; id.,
Feb. 12, 1938, p. 20.
39. Vicksburg merchants who financed an $80,000 plant at Vicksburg found the
weekly payroll of $3,000 stopped by a strike against seven and eight dollar wages. The
Journal of Tupelo, Miss., found an average wage of $9 at Columbia and one considerably
lower at Hattiesburg. See (1937) 123 LIT. DIGEST 35.
40. N. Y. World Telegram, Dec. 31, 1936.
41. The Tennessee Conference of Social Work (1937) estimates that 70%, of the
relief load in small cities of the state is the wake left by such migratory concerns. See
(1937) 123 LIT. DIGEST 35, 36.
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scant capital and rented machinery, and replacing them with outright com-
munity ownership and operation. In any event, the municipal building pro-
visions of the statute are already being widely utilized, 42 and the plan should
prove a potent weapon in Mississippi's fight for industrialization.
More significant than the success or failure of the Industrial Plan in at-
taining its immediate objectives are the reprisals that may be occasioned by
this type of statute. Subsidized municipal industries imported to relieve un-
employment need not be operated on an economic basis, but their goods will
flow into interstate commerce in competition with those of non-subsidized
industries in other states. Such competition might be considered unfair in
terms of our present economic predilections. For the Supreme Court to
express this viewpoint by a reversal of its present hands-off policy would
seem an unwarranted extension of the due process restriction. But the more
industrialized states desirous of combating subsidization are perhaps not
powerless to do so. Legislative barriers prohibiting importation into these
states of the products of subsidized factories would wall off the primary
consumer markets and to a large extent nullify the inducements which now
motivate migration. Similar statutes aimed at protecting "free labor and
industry" now rob of their market goods made in government factories by
convict labor.43 To be effective, such statutes would necessarily have to be
supplemented by federal legislation like that which now prohibits interstate
commerce in prison-made goods.4 4 Similar legislation has already been pro-
posed as a means of strengthening state minimum vrage laws. 45 Quite aside
from doubtful questions of constitutionality, such state "tariffs" may well be
the logical countermove in this increasingly bitter sectional struggle.40
42. Since the inauguration of the plan in Mississippi, 15,000 jobs have been created.
Sixty communities waited for the decision of the Supreme Court before voting on bond
issues. Natchez has voted a $300,000 issue to build a factory designed as a tire plant
for a West Haven, Conn. company. See Bus. WrEK, Feb. 12, 1933, p. 20.
43. Nineteen states regulate or prohibit the sale of convict-made goods. Alabama
v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286 (1934) ; see Whitfield v. State, 49 Ohio App. 530, 539, 197 N.E.
605, 608 (1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 431 (1936).
44. Interstate transportation of convict-made goods is unlawful if they are destined
for a state in which their sale is prohibited by local law. 49 STAT. 494 (1935) 49
U. S. C. § 61 (Supp. 1938).
45. See CoLIxER's, April 30, 1938, p. 49.
46. In emphasizing the sectional nature of this contest, it should not be overlooled
that competition for industry may be intra-regional and intra-state as well. For reloca-
tion of the shoe industry within New England, see HoovEn, LocAroc; Tnrory AzD THE
SHOE AND LEATHER INusTmzEs (1937). See N. Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1934, p. 17, id.,
June 16, 1935, at 7, for upstate New York attempts to induce industry to remove from
New York City.
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